Preface
When I started with research about the working process of Swedish
General Staff regarding trench warfare I was assuming that I would find big
amount of documentation about the process already starting from the end of 1914 and the beginning of 1915. It was during that period when the war de facto developed from a mobile war to positional war and through time
became more positional on the western front and less on the eastern front because
of geographic differences. However, after several months of research, I came to the conclusion
that working process with trench warfare in the SGS was not as I expected it to
be since the real and more dynamic process started first in the middle of 1916. And
until the middle of 1916 many changes among fighting armies took place compared
to the organization, tactics and equipment of the armies that started the war
in summer of 1914. Trench warfare resulted
in developments such as new assault and defence tactics, types of units, equipment
etc.
The SGS had been engaged in working with trench warfare before WWI during
the Russo-Japanese war 1904-1905 and Balkan Wars 1912-1913. The discussions based
on gathered information from these wars included aspects such as assignments
for infantry, artillery and engineer troops during attack on or defence of a fortified
position. And a general aspect of the time that affected the discussions was the
offensive spirit, a contemporary
thought that attack was more vital and stronger than defence.[1] For many officers in the armed forces conclusions form
the war between Russia and Japan was that offensive warfare still was dominant over defensive warfare and
just as the wars on Balkans did not mean or implicated any radical changes for warfare. Despise that
these wars were overshadowed by trench
warfare, especially during Russo-Japanese war, these wars were in many contemporary
military eyes actually confirming contemporary
views such as moral supremacy and impotence of bayonet charges. One Swedish officer,
probably an engineer officer, wrote in an essay that was published in the journal
of Royal Academy of War Science that:
The number of obstacles that could be found in
Manchuria should barely be worthy of looking forward to European theatre. These
devices take a long time and place and are thereby better off for positional
warfare than for the mobile warfare which we can expect in our part of the world.[2]
According to
several other essays written after the war there was no need for bigger changes
in army regulations. Captain Lindencrona
who spend a couple of months on a study tour with the Bulgarian army during first
Balkan War wrote in his report regarding combat between Bulgarians and Ottoman troops
that the Bulgarian bayonet changes led to high casualties among Bulgarian
troops. The main reason was that attacks were performed without reaching
firepower superiority. It was however still thanks to the offensive spirit and
moral superiority which lead to success for Bulgarian army: Balkan War 1912-1913 had left new, unequivocal evidence
of the tremendous value of the attack.[3]
Developments and changes before WWI
In 1904 a new regulation for infantry was published and was used until 1915.
According to it, infantry should perform attack against entrenched position with the assistance of artillery. Otherwise, infantry was supposed to attack on its own
by using the so-called rifle batteries (gevärsbatterier)
where small detachments would support the main attacking force by rifle fire on
vital spots of enemies defence.[4] Also
during attack reserves were supposed to be put on flanks in order to achieve
the critical breakthrough. Regarding defence of a fortified position, regulation
did not mention as much information as for attack and the information was
mostly about field works for entrenchment.
The experience from the Russo-Japanese war was a part of the process which resulted in Sweden as the bigger
European state obtained heavier howitzers for its artillery in order to be able to perform attack against fortified
positions.[5] On
the theoretical level, there were several developments. Captain Gustaf Bouveng
who was SGS officer, and later during WWI one of the army’s main experts in
trench warfare with infantry combat as specialization, wrote a book in year 1907
called Attack on fortified position.[6]
For the book, he used sources from the Swedish military attache who during the
war followed the Japanese army and also writings of German military observers.
One of his main arguments in the book was that infantry could not perform an
attack against a fortified position without artillery support. This argument
was in direct contrast to the contemporary infantry regulation from 1904. During the years after Bouvengs book, new
instructions for infantry and artillery filed works were published with manuals
for trenches, canon nests, shelters etc.[7] Also
in 1910 a new learning material for engineer troops and shooting manuals for
heavy howitzers were published.
And later in the beginning of 1914, the SGS published
a draft copy called Utkast till
instruktion för anfall mot befästningar which included information about
attack performance against fortified positions in positional warfare.[8] The
draft copy did not mention anything about defence and was not processed into a
final version. It did not mention anything about earlier war experiences but it
did define the meaning of positional warfare (in Swedish called ställningskrig) where it was written
that attack against field fortified positions
demanded higher proportion of usage of artillery and engineer troops and more comprehensive planning.[9]
It regulated that artillery should in the first place take action on defenders
artillery and in second place on defenders infantry. Also, a part of the
artillery would be brought up for a closer cooperation with the infantry during the
final attack and together with firepower from machine guns would engage in the parts
of enemy’s position where the main attack was to be performed.[10]
The infantry’s advance was supposed to take place from firing position
to firing position until a relevant distance from defenders field works was achieved.
The attacking infantry would then entrench itself and start preparations for breakthrough.
If it was possible the special equipment
consisting of trench scissors, hand grenades, infantry shields and sandbags
would be provided to the attacking troops. After breakthroughs in defence were achieved
the infantry through closer cooperation with artillery and engineer troops
would make a successful attack through superior firepower, troop’s morale, good
communication between commanders and also the initiative of commanders in the
first line. [11]
Reference list
[1] For more about
the spirit of offensive I recommend the book Command or Control? Command, Training and Tactics in the British and
German Armies, 1888-1918 written by Martin Samuels.
[2] Royal Academy
of War Science (Kungliga Krigsvetenskaps Akademin) from annual publication
called Handlingar och Tidskrift
published in 1908 form essay ”Fältbefästningstyperna enligt senaste
krigserfarenheter” s.299. ”Den omfattning, som hinderanordningarna
fingo i Mandchuriet, torde knappast vara att emotse å en europeisk
krigsskådeplats. Dessa anordningar taga mycket tid och platser alltså bättre
för ett ställningskrig än för det rörliga fältkriget vi i vår världsdel kunna
vänta oss.”
[3] From Captain Lindencronas study tour report. For more
info please contact me.
[4] Exercisreglemente
för infanteriet fastställt 1904. S.181-196 (Stockholm; Kungliga Boktryckeriet
Norstedts och Söner, 1904).
[5] Statsverkspropositionen 1907, fjärde
huvudtiteln. Protokoll över lantförsvarsärenden 13 januari 1906.
[6] Bouveng, Gustaf.
Anfall mot befäst ställning
(Stockholm; Kungliga Boktryckeriet P.A Norstedt och Söner, 1907)
[7] Search on the
reference list.
[9] Utkast s.5-6
[10] s.19-23
[11] s.23-30
