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Stockholm, Sweden
My academic blog with history, primarily military history as the main theme. Please leave a comment that can be relevant and useful for the topic which you find interesting. I am writing in several languages, including English, depending on the theme and the languages of the sources. At the moment I am working as guide at Batteriet Arholma military museum in Stockholm. For further information please contact me on lauvlad89@gmail.com

fredag 26 september 2014

Lessons from the Great War - Trench warfare developments in Swedish army during the WWI . Part VII. Officers course in trench warfare

In the same period as the SGS during the autumn of 1916 proposed several measures to be conducted for the army regarding trench warfare there was also a proposal for an officer-course. The aim of the course was to educate officers in usage of hand grenades, mortars, infantry shields and other technical equipment and also about filed fortifications works and cooperation between infantry and artillery during attack and defence.[1] The course later decided to be performed during two weeks in October of 1917. The officers came mainly from the infantry and engineer units while others came from the artillery and Royal Fortification.[2] According to the course plan the main effort was placed on attack combat. Officers were even trained how to perform in a storm patrol (stormpatrull) which meant that the stormtroopers tactic was a part of the course. The course commander, Lt Col Gustaf Lillehöök who also was the chief of the Royal War Academy, was studying the stormtroopers in May of 1917 in the German and Austro-Hungarian army.

According to the report that was written after the course a conclusion can be made that the Swedish army had the latest knowledge regarding trench warfare. In one of the lectures during the course it was mentioned that trench warfare was a result consisting of development in military technology and the sizes of the armies, especially of the Great Powers. Also, it was mentioned about the risks of presuming or believing that mobile warfare had lost its importance. The developments of the war had shown that a breakthrough and mobile warfare still could be achieved.  It was also mentioned that a long term positional war in Sweden was unlikely because of the geographical reasons and political situation. It meant that Sweden was unlikely to be attacked since its neutral position and that the long borders and areas of the country meant that long lines of trenches were hard to achieve both for the attacker and defender.[3] In the end, mobile warfare was according to lecture still a necessity in the case of war.

The course meant that the knowledge in the SGS was on a very high level since it was based on the latest experiences mainly from the central powers. But when it comes to knowledge about trench warfare among the army’s officers corps it is doubtful that the level of knowledge could be considered high. Lilliehööks own opinion was that the length of the course was not enough for a deeper education. It was instead more an orientation of the latest experiences.





[1] KrA, generalstaben, chefsexpeditionen, f.d. hemliga, serie B I. Skrivelse frånchefen för generalstaben till Konungen daterad 23 nov 1916.
[2] Lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition, f.d. hemliga arkiv, serie E I, vol 40. Underdånig rapport över kursen i ställningskrig, daterad 1 dec 1917. The course included 10 specially requested officers, 16 regimental officers, 80 company officers and 93 non-commissioned officers.
[3] Ibid.
[4] Ibid.

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