Lessons from the Great War - Trench warfare developments in Swedish army during the WWI. Part VIII. Tests for a new infantry organization

After the exercises in trench warfare during the summer of 1917 the Infantry Inspection and its chief Tingsten made an analysis about the future needs for the development of infantry. According to Tingstens own words it was hard to drove a line between the trench warfare within the frame of mobile warfare and trench warfare within the frame of positional warfare. He also assumed that the training for mobile warfare was still central at the same time as it was necessary to prepare for the positional warfare as long as it was possible.

There was also a need in order to work with positional warfare to create a new organisation for the infantry training since positional warfare included special weapons and new tactics.[1] Tingsten also assumed that the experiences from the war were not sufficiently analysed in order to make a more complete analysis regarding the concept for infantry training in trench warfare. On one side the infantry had not received enough training in trench warfare during 1917 which led to the conclusion that more resources were needed for enhancing the training capabilities. On the other side, there was a discussion about how much the current training organisation was actually needed to be changed in accordance with the latest war experiences and the warfare that was developing all the time.

However, Tingsten was even putting focus on usage of mortars, flamethrowers and trench canons ant that these systems could not only be operated by personnel from artillery and engineers but even had to be handled by infantrymen. In order to perform that it was according to him necessary with field tests regarding training in trench warfare before it could be decided on how much the current training organization was needed to be modified.[2]  

Test training for trench warfare

On the 29 November 1917, a general order was published by Land defence ministry regarding the tests for training in trench warfare. The purpose was to gather more knowledge and incitements on a practical level in order to be able to make a decision for the future training organisation for the infantry during the war- and peacetime.[3]

New instructions and manuals for trench warfare were published including a proposal for instruction for usage of hand grenades.[4] In the hand grenade proposal, there was a trace of the stormtroopers tactic since it was stated that every infantry company should have a specially organized hand grenade patrols consisting of the most skilled and daring soldiers in order to solve special assignments. Exercises in hand grenade combat were to be performed in the form of cooperation between storm patrols, regular infantry and support from mortars and machine-guns.[5]

The tests were performed in three infantry regiments: I14, I15 and I17. The idea was to test three different types of unit organization. The first test was to use the current organization where a regiment had 12 rifle companies, one machine-gun company and to add a number of companies for specialised need such as medics, mortar squads, signal troops or searchlight personnel. The second and even the third case was to reduce the number of infantry companies in favour of the special companies. I 17 was also chosen for the establishment of the so-called Grenadier Company, for the training of stormtroopers / special training for trench warfare. The all three regiments were provided with 2 cm trench mortars and I 17 was for its Grenadier company provided with one flamethrower and 150 hand grenades. This occasion was probably the most organized work with the stormtroopers tactic on the practical level in the Swedish army during the WWI.

 "Granatenwerfer" was a German trench mortar usually used on low level by platoons or companies. It could be handled by two-three soldiers depending on the situation. Swedish army was provided with these during WWI.  

This was one of the first flamethrowers in the Swedish army. FM 18 was an experimental model. It was obtained in order to implement the latest experiences and equipment from the war. A big thanks to Thomas Wictor who provided me with this picture and who is one of the best flamethrower experts in the world. 

Aftermath

After the tests from beginning of February until the end of October Tingstens opinions was that the specialization of the infantry’s training for trench warfare was not needed to be driven longer than necessary. The proposal for a new educational organization for the infantry was that infantry regiments should consist of 9 rifle companies, one machine-gun company and three special companies.

One of the opinions was that stormtroopers training was to be included in regular soldier training and not in specialized units.[6] This meant that he drew the same conclusion as it was done in the German army where during the beginning of 1918.

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[1] KrA, Infanteriinspektionen, serie B I, 1917. Ang infanteriets utbildning för strid om befästa ställningar date­rad 17 okt 1917.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition, serie B I, vol. 78, generalorder 29 november 1917 nr 1593.

[4] Ibid, generalorder 12 oktober 1917 nr 1384: Beträffande utbildningen i handgranatsstrid vid infanteriet under ut­bild­ningsåret 1917-1918 och 13 oktober 1917 nr 1393: Beträffande Infanteriets utbildning inom kompani för ställningskriget under utbildningsåret 1917-1918. 

[5] Förslag till instruktion för använd­ning av handgra­nater, fastställd enligt generalorder 23 nov 1917 nr 1557, (Stockholm: Lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition, 1917), s. 17 och 22.

[6] KrA, infanteriinspektionen, serie B, Angående omläggningen av infanteriets utbildning daterad 30 okt 1918.