About me

Mitt foto
Stockholm, Sweden
My academic blog with history, primarily military history as the main theme. Please leave a comment that can be relevant and useful for the topic which you find interesting. I am writing in several languages, including English, depending on the theme and the languages of the sources. At the moment I am working as guide at Batteriet Arholma military museum in Stockholm. For further information please contact me on lauvlad89@gmail.com

onsdag 22 februari 2017

Changing the analytical model for EP-elections analysis



My study aimed to explore how the current analytical approach regarding the second-order elections theory and the EP-elections analysis can be changed by adding the aspect of political communication. The process was conducted by studying political communication among the electoral manifestos of the national political parties during the EP-elections in Sweden in 2014. The conclusions of this paper are presented in the following order.

1.    It has to be acknowledged is that the current SOE theoretical approach of Reif and Schmitt still maintains a certain amount of scientific legitimacy when EP-elections are analysed. The model can still be applicable with a more limited scope, such as for the study of voting behaviour. This mainly depends on the fact that EP-elections usually have voting turnouts below 50 per cent, brighter prospects for new and smaller parties comparing to the national political arena and the political behaviour during campaigns where the number of MEPs is relevant to the importance of individual bailouts. This part of the original analytical approach is still relevant to a certain degree.



2.    The SOE theory and analytical framework needs to be modified in order to enable a more thorough understanding of the electoral process. The contemporary critique of the SOE theory is providing a clear and obvious reasoning that the current SOE framework can be considered as problematic. The critique shows that the framework is often not responding to reality and outcome of the electoral processes of second-order elections. The demand for modification also includes the fact that the EP has undergone an institutional change meaning that the original “less is at stake” dimension has gradually been replaced by increased prospect of the “EU-dimension” meaning that “more is at stake”. The part of the critique regarding the micro (individual) level is justifiable since it provides more support to the conclusions that a larger part of voters actually vote according to their interest in EU-issues. This includes that the voters can both vote for and against certain issues relevant for EU-level of decision-making.



3.    By comparing the character of the political communication new conclusions could be made and assumptions can be confirmed or disconfirmed. The adding of the political communication aspect as a part of modification of the current analytical model will influence the further development of new theoretical approaches when it comes to the SOE theory. This would also have an effect on the implementation of the methodological nationalism by providing conclusions that the “nationalization bias” of the EP-elections should become excluded from future definitions and analytical approaches. Instead of understanding the EP-elections through the character of national elections or through character of every member state per se it would be possible to get a more thorough understanding of the political communication process at the EU-wide level. It would be a vital part of the updating process for a new analytical approach.


4.    The new scientific development should also lead to new understanding of the EP-elections “hybrid” character where the grade of uniformity regarding the “European/national” status of the elections can be measured by focusing on the political communication. According to the results of this study and the critique of the theory, findings support the hypothesis that the model can be modified. The role of the political communication in the study can directly influence the arguments if the EP-elections in general or in respective EU-member states can be regarded as second-order elections or elections of second-order importance. The analysis of the level of political communication was made in order to provide conclusions if the SOE theory could be confirmed or disconfirmed. This study, limited to electoral manifestos of the main political parties, finds that the political communication in the main policy areas according to the voters was predominantly based on political communication at the EU-level. This means that the results of the study are not confirming the expectations of the SOE theory which is based on that EP-elections being “nationalized” even regarding the political communication.



5.    At the same time, it is important to note that this study was limited to Sweden and based on the specific issues relevant for just that member state. Conclusions from other member states will depend on the outcome and how the arguments and statements, as vital parts of the political communication, were stated as well as to what level of governance they were relating to. The modification of the analytical framework regarding the EP-elections should include more aspects when it comes to political communication. The selection of the arguments and statements was depending on the rational basis being provided by an electoral survey performed by a simple random sample.



The adding of the political communication aspect would make the current model more applicable for the analysis of the future EP-elections. At the same time, this modification should not be regarded as only limited to the studies of the electoral manifestos. The political communication can be studied by using several options. It can include areas as debates on TV and radio, media articles and political commercials. The studies of the political communication can also provide additional understanding of the voting behaviour. For example, this study finds that political communication regarding environmental issues did reflect the voting behaviour where environmental issues were regarded as the most interesting topic for the voters.


The adding of the political communication aspect would improve the model's ability to deal with and include aspects which were not originally included. The EP-elections should be analysed and understood on their own terms and not as national elections. Concerning the lack of the “micro-perspective”, the voters are also voting due to their interests in the EU-level issues and not due to the national-level political communication. The modification of the model, by studying if the political communication can be regarded as EU-level or national-level with combination of the voting behaviour studies regarding the choice and motivation of the voters, could lead to implementation of the micro perspective in the analysis.


Regarding the EP-elections in Sweden this study provides findings that are confirming the earlier opinions about the character of the political communication made in the aftermath of the electoral process. The character of the electoral manifestos in most of the cases is supporting the reasoning that the national political parties view the EP-elections with more interest in order to provide the kind of political communication the voters are expecting or demanding.


By finding similar results in other member states it would indicate a need to modify the SOE approach. First modification could regard the view on the expectation of the theory. Instead of having a starting point that the national-level political communication would dominate the new theoretical approach, it would be more suitable to assume that the EU-level political communication will dominate. The second modification should concern the analytical aspects of the original Reif and Schmitt conclusions. Their analytical model could be modified in order to be more a “de-nationalized” way of analysing the EP-elections proposed down below. 


1. Voting turnout

2. Voting behaviour (motivation, individual bailouts, age, social group etc.)

3. Party performance (including party-groups in European Parliament)

4. Political communication character (media, manifestos, marketing)  




This proposal is based on a need for the importance to include the micro perspective, which goes hand in hand with the character of political communication. However, to provide more supporting conclusions and due to the limitations of this study, there are several proposals regarding which aspects could be examined. For example, similar studies as this one could be performed on the EP-elections in 2014 in other member states. Another possibility is that political communication could be studied in media, especially the articles in the public debate during the elections. The media aspects could also include the analysis of political advertising such as posters and TV-commercials. When it comes to the analyses of the EP-elections, it would be necessary to improve the current analytical approach during the next EP-elections in 2019. This could be done by applying an EU-wide study where political communication could be researched by the relevant aspects and by performing argumentation analysis, discourse (debate) analysis or communication analysis.  


For more information about my work, please download the paper here.  


Political communication during EP-elections in Sweden among the political parties


In this post, I am wiring about the results of the analysis performed in my master thesis about political communication by studying the EP-elections in Sweden during 2014. The mentioned policy areas have been chosen based on their popularity in accordance with the results in Statistics Sweden survey before the elections. During the study, I applied four categories of political communication levels: EU, EU-regional, National and Hybrid. Also, in the end, the trend level is presented. Here I offer political communication among the political parties based on statements in their electoral programs.  


For more information about my work, please download the paper here. 




































In the next post, I am going to write about conclusions from the study. 


måndag 20 februari 2017

EP-elections 2014 in Sweden







The EP-elections In Sweden in 2014 were in many cases presented and recognised as the most important so far. The elections were regarded as vital because of issues such as the economic crisis, polices of the Eurozone and further political integration, compounded by popular perceptions of the social, political and democratic crisis. There were also other aspects such as EP`s role and legislative powers regarding single market regulations, free movement of persons, amendment and approval of the annual budget and the reforms of the Common Agricultural Policy. However, despite the EP-election campaigns, the voters, parties and the media were still focusing more on national rather than European issues. This development was confirmed by the findings concerning the “national focus” according to Statistics Sweden (Statistiska centralbyrån, SCB) explaining that the voters experienced that the electoral process regarded the EU-questions in a small scale.



To understand the electoral process during 2014 it is relevant to make a comparison with a similar process during 2009. The EP-elections in Sweden in 2009 were the fourth elections since Sweden became an EU-member state. The election process such as voting turnout, the performance of the parties and the political communication was in wide fitting into SOE concept, which I explained in the earlier posts. The political discussion was focusing on national issues, and the turnout was approximately 50 per cent of the national elections. The larger parties received a lower amount of votes while smaller parties received a higher amount of votes than during national elections. There were, at the same time specific and significant differences compared to the previous four elections. The elections process was characterised by the higher turnout than before, more EU-positive rhetoric, entry of the Piratpartiet (The Pirate Party) with two Members of European Parliament (MEPs) despite being outside of the Riksdag (The Swedish Parliament) and a more interesting internal political debate since the EP-elections took place one year before the national ones.









According to Table 1 the voting turnout increased since 2004 for both electoral categories, but the highest voter turnout is during the national elections. During the 2014 parts of the legacy and experiences from 2009 were influencing the 2014 campaign. Despite the national level rhetoric during the elections, the political communication regarding the “EU-dimension” was considered as higher than before. Comparing to previous elections, the rhetoric provided by the main political parties was not based on the perception “yes or no” to EU, but rather what EU should be. This development is an example that is encountering specific amounts of the existing knowledge and theoretical framework regarding the SOE, which therefore has been under critique from the scholars as Arjan H. Schakel.



The 2009 EP-elections were also regarded as more important for voters than the previous elections. The turnout was 46 per cent comparing to 38 per cent in 2004. And it was the first time when the national political parties were using election commercials on television. However, the situation regarding knowledge among the citizens, media reporting and political communication from the parties about the EU-level issues were not considered as improved. The behaviour of the political parties regarding argumentation, political mobilisation and realisation of the democratic values was in general not similar as during the national elections processes. This development can also be noticed in Table 2 observing that in 1994 EP-elections were held in 1995 in Sweden after the referendum on EU-membership, while during 2014 both EP- and national elections took place. One of the reasons was the constant political communication based on encouragement to vote, and the percentage of voters increased from 46 per cent in 2009 to 51 per cent in 2014. This means that this was the first time that voter turnout in EP-elections in Sweden was above 50 per cent.



The elections were also regarded as necessary by the political parties for the mobilisation process since the national polls were taking place four months later. The role of the political candidates for the EP was concluded as one of the vital factors for the outcome for the elections. This conclusion is based on that the process for electing 20 MEPs is providing a stronger influence on the elections process for the voters than the means of choosing 349 members of the national parliament.


One of the key topics was the principle of subsidiarity where several parties from left to right argued about in which areas EU should do more or do less, by leaving polices to be dealt with at the national level. This included areas such as democracy, human rights, economy, trade, migration, environment and the fight against crime. Among the arguments were also that the EU should not create common policy for media, tourism and culture. The discourse, with a focus based on labour market politics, was regarding the EU’s general ability to create new jobs. The Social Democrats argued that the focus on growth and employment regards fair terms of employment and also the environment. This was opposite to the Moderates who kept their focus on market liberalisation policies. However, the two parties shared similar rhetoric about the need for the EU to work for more free trade and to fight against protectionism.



The election process was, at the same time, a winning situation for the small parties. Except the Green Party which achieved four mandates, other smaller parties as the Feminist Initiative and the Sweden Democrats were considered as the winners of the elections. The success of Feminist Initiative being able to achieve one mandate in the EP meant that several other parties had to address issues regarding women rights and gender while the more substantial scepticism towards the EU, apart from the Sweden Democrats, also came from the Left Party. For the Moderate Party, which at the time was a government party, the results of EP-elections were regarded as electoral decline. Also for liberals, there was a declining electoral support despite political communication based on decentralisation and further EU-integration as well as human rights, citizenship and personal integrity issues. 






Climate, sustainable development and the environment were other significant issues in the political debate. The question of environment, together with the energy issues was regarded as more critical during EP-elections (33 per cent) than during national ones (21 per cent) if measured by the share of the voters. The Green Party, as expected, wanted the EU to focus on the environment, but also to reform the refugee policy, which was later considered to be a part of their winning success while both the Social-Democrats and the Moderates performed worse than during national elections despite being the largest parties. A more unique and visible feature of the electoral discourse was the issue of the growing populism and extremism in EU. Most of the parties were united in this question by providing rhetoric where voters were urged to participate in the elections process to reduce the amount of populist votes. This was especially regarding the number of votes for the Sweden Democrats. Overall from the populist parties, there was more disapproval than praise for the EU where a frequent target of criticism was connected to moving the parliament between Brussels and Strasbourg as well as the Brussels bureaucracy.




The overall process of the EP-elections in Sweden during 2014, despite the covariance regarding the SOE theory can, therefore, be regarded as a development where the “EU-dimension.” of the elections can be considered as more noticed. The short period between the EP- and national elections shows the results of the EP- elections process was undermining the opinion that the EP-election processes are “nationalised”, even when being close to national elections. The voting behaviour, such as choice of the party and the importance of the candidates as well as the political issues and respective programs were different in comparison between the national and EP-elections and the difference indicates the importance of “institutional difference” of electoral categories for the voters.


For more information about my work, please download the paper here. 



lördag 18 februari 2017

Critique of the Second Order Elections theory (EP-elections)


In political science regarding the research about EP-elections it is often assumed in principle that elections that produce national governments are the most important ones for the vast majority of voters and political parties. The part of the critique regarding the Second Order Elections theory as mentioned in the former post is that the other kinds of elections are per se proclaimed as of second-order importance, as the case is with the EP-elections. As such they are regarded to be understood and analysed as the elections subordinated for the function of the national-level politics.



The theoretical benchmark of the research regarding the European electoral processes is that one of the main characteristics is the overall use of national-level rules and political behaviour, including the use of national-level political communication. According to the research, this is based on the ways the national political parties perceive the importance of the electoral process and the relevant policy issues. The argument is that national political parties are determined to use the national political communication to ensure that voters will understand the message. However, findings and arguments regarding the Reif and Schmitt approach is the central part of criticism of SOE theory during the latest years.



Initially, it is important to understand in which kind of context the SOE theory was developed. The main inspiration was the sub-national elections process in West-Germany among the Länder which were studied by the political scientist Reinar Dinkel during the end of the 1970’s. The “nationalised political logic” in the case of the federal structure as West-Germany was evident as well as in the elections for the US Congress regarding the institutional powers among levels of the governance and their importance for the voters at the sub-national level. The German federalism during the period in which Dinkel focused on can be regarded as a highly “nationalised” variant of federalism which for example did not value or promote much of the principle of territorial diversity and autonomy and was institutionally focused on delivering that commitment through joint action by federal and Land governments. Therefore the “nationalised political logic” in the case of the federal structure as West-Germany was visible as well as in the elections for the US Congress regarding the institutional powers among levels of the governance and their importance for the voters at the sub-national level.



Scholars as Schakel and Jeffery have questioned the so-called ”nationalisation bias” of the Reif and Schmitt approach where the second-order elections are regarded as subordinated to national policies and driven by national issues. The initial arguments of Reif and Schmitt have also been questioned regarding the conceptualisation and understanding of the EP-elections by using the nationalised logic including aspects as voting behaviour and political communication. According to Schakel and Jeffery the “denationalising” elaborations of the know-ledge about EP elections have been ignored by researchers working through what they present as” intellectually frozen SOE concept from the middle of 1980’.



The critique is also based on that the research of the EP-elections is influenced by the methodological nationalism where supranational or sub-national electoral processes, despite their dependency on national rules, are being studied as a kind of second-order national elections. From the start the intent in applying SOE analytical approach was mostly not based on seeking for confirmation that national factors dominated in regional election outcomes. This was rather based on identifying where and why regional elections did not confirm the “nationalised” SOE expectations. Despite the modifications of the SOE approach through different means since its first definition by Reif and Schmitt, the issue of nationalised conceptual framework is by the scholars as Schakel and Jeffery regarded as risky for making unreflected assumption that all other forms of electoral competition are subordinate to national politics and thereby underscoring the uncritical methodological assumption that the national scale of politics is the only one of ”real importance”.


The argument of Schakel and Jeffery is that regional as well as the EP-elections should be understood and analysed on their own terms and not as national elections. The “less at stake” in second-order elections comparing to the national ones was based on voting behaviour where voters used the SOE as an opportunity to vent their short temperament about national-level politics. For example by performing protest voting for fringe parties or by not participating in the electoral process:



Reif and Schmitt’s assumption that there is more at stake in national elections than EP or regional elections are credible enough. What appears less credible is that what is at stake nationally necessarily crowds out distinct judgements about the issues that might be at stake in regional (sub-national) elections.



However, the issue of what is “at stake” in regional and European elections has changed. Schakel and Jeffery describe this by stating that there are now more is at stakethan before. One reason is that there are far more states having elections to regional parliaments, including those parliaments which had accumulated new powers, than when the SOE theory was being developed. Second reason is that there are more EU-member states due to enlargements processes as well as the institutional capabilities of the EP have increased. This has also resulted in changed voting behaviour where EU-citizens are voting for proposals for political solutions at the EU-level. Among the main criticism of the theory is its assumption that the national rhetoric will dominate despite the status of the election, such as regional or European.




The theory of Reif and Schmitt has also been criticised for being developed only on the macro level and not on the micro-level (individual level). According to this part of the critique, the micro-level approach means that there can be several explanations why the voters are doing as they do during the elections process and that a micro approach can provide new understandings in relation with the theory. The criticism is based on that the voters in many cases do care about the arguments presented by the parties, especially if the issues themselves can be recognised as necessary for the EU-level decision-making. It also means that national rhetoric during the EP-elections is not always the most driving motive for the voters to participate. This has also been the case in Sweden where it is argued that the “EU-dimension” agenda, such as EU-integration, makes it attractive for the voters for how the parties actually are arguing regardless their support to the government or large parties. An alternative or additional explanation why for example the “large parties” perform less well during the EP-elections than during the national ones is that voters find political communication among other parties more preferable and better. 


For more information about my work, please download the paper here. 

fredag 17 februari 2017

Second Order Elections theory


The composition of the directly elected European Parliament does not precisely reflect the “real” balance of political forces in the European Community. As long as the national political systems decide most of what there is to be decided politically, and everything really important, European elections are additional national second-order elections.


Reif and Schmitt developed the second-order elections (SOE) theoretical framework partly on the basis of the studies of midterm elections in the USA and also partly on the regional elections in Germany which later was adopted for conditions within the analysis of elections for the European Community during the period when the EP elections became democratic.


Among the main reasoning behind the definition was the argument about the “less at stake dimension” of the electoral process. According to Reif and Schmitt the EP-elections were influenced by the consequence of the electoral process not being equal or similar to state-level politics. This is regarding aspects such as the formation of government and opposition as well as the manner of how the national political parties perceived the importance of the electoral process. Furthermore the scholars noted other contemporary aspects, such as the lower level of institutional power of the formerly European Community, when compared to national parties as well as the issues with the political awareness among citizens regarding the fact that the European electoral process was a new electoral concept including newly formed European party-federations.


The analytical model within the original SOE approach is comprehending voting turn-out, amount of individual voting bailouts, performance of political parties with more focus on small and new parties, and how the government party is affected by the electoral process. This model is based on the original study of Reif and Schmitt. The outcome and the characteristics of the electoral process in 1979 the analytical model within the SOE theory was based on the four concluding and finding aspects of the study: lower level of participation, brighter prospects for small and new political parties, higher percentage of invalidated ballots and the government party losses.


The lower level of participation is relevant to the assumption that the ”less is at stake” dimension influences the voting behaviour of the voters where fewer number of voters may consider the EP-elections as sufficiently important to vote. This can also be noticed in the political development where voting turn-out and participation of the voting population is lower during EP-elections than in the national ones.


The brighter prospects for small and new political parties mark the differences related to the voting behaviour during first-order and second-order electoral processes. This means that larger parties, during the first-order elections, get votes from voters whose actual preference lies with a small or new party during the EP-elections and vice versa. In many cases small and new parties have better electoral performance during the EP-elections than during national ones.


The higher percentage of invalidated ballot indicates that the role of political candidates is more important during the campaign in order to mobilize electoral support. This is based on the number of candidates for the EP which is in every member state lower than the number of candidates during the elections for national parliaments. Due to that, the individual importance of the political candidates is by the political parties considered as higher compared to their importance in the national elections. 


The last aspect related to the government party losses, is based on conclusions that the popularity of a national government and the political parties which constitute it increases shortly after the election, only to decline again after the EP-elections. It means that in accordance with the analytical model the government parties tend to be considered as “electoral losers” since they perform less well comparing to results during national elections. One explanation is also that many voters use the EP-elections in order to “punish” the government party by voting for the main competitors at the state level.


With the “less is at stake” dimension Reif and Schmitt based their arguments on that the EP-elections depend on the national electoral dimension, meaning national politics. They explained, as in accordance with the analytical framework, that the campaigning process for EP-elections, therefore, had a smaller significance for political parties than the national election process. The fact is at the same time that the electoral procedure regulations for the EP-elections were at the time of the Reif and Schmitt study and still are determined by state legislators, and also that most have originally retained the main features of the system used during state elections. In such terms, there is a connection between the EP-elections process and the respective national configuration and features which make the EP-elections “nationalized” despite their supranational character.


One characteristic which makes the EP-elections of second-order importance according to the theory is the more important role of individual candidates in order to have successful mobilization since the parties are usually mobilizing less financial and human resources comparing to national elections. For obtaining a successful elections the issue of mobilization of candidates regarded as famous and popular is vital since voters tend to regard the political issues as less important than during the first order elections. This means that voters’ behaviour is influenced by the national political communication at various degrees as Reif and Schmitt present


Many voters cast their votes in these elections not only as a result of conditions obtaining within the specific context of the second-order arena, but also on the basis of factors in the main political arena of the nation. The strategy and tactics of political parties in second-order election campaigns are often influenced by political calculations concerning the main arena.


The role of media is also connected to the national level political arena. The election process will become more interesting for the voters if the media is focusing on first-order political issues which are the national policy issues. This aspect is directly related to the political campaign procedure. If the political parties and their activity in the SOE political arena succeed in the mobilization process, especially regarding the individuals holding top as middle-level public and party positions, their chances of mobilizing voters directly and via the mass media would be better. The opposite development is, after a party concludes that its chances of winning a relatively large share of votes in a low turnout situation are good, that the party will not put so much effort into the political campaign in order not to provoke the competitor to “generalize” the campaign in the sense of introducing national policy issues.



For a political party, it can namely be more favourable to deal with political communication which is based on gathering already loyal supporters rather than going into more active and increased competition for voters. This can be the case when political actors would avoid EU-level political communication on purpose. Among the reasons can also be the lack of EU-level relevant political communication or the assessment that voters would not understand the message. Performing the national-level political communication can, therefore, be regarded as a more confident and safe method for the political actors. 


In my next post, I am going to write about the critique of SOE theory. The whole text can be downloaded here


tisdag 14 februari 2017

Theory - Political communication and EP-elections




Political communication is vital in politics since the representation of the popular political wills requires it. The process of performing political communication is considered as more important, especially during the ongoing political campaigns and election process when media in principle is devoting the higher level of coverage. The political communication includes different aspects which political actors such as political parties are using to communicate their arguments, values and messages to the voting population. This process can be performed by using political manifestos, publishing debate articles or using political advertising in the form of multimedia videos and posters. By such measures, the political actors are depending on performing political communication that can be considered as efficient to achieve successful results. For political parties, this is regarded as vital since political communication is influencing the voters’ decisions when it comes to making the electoral choice of party. In such terms, the political communication is influencing the outcomes of an electoral process, allocation of power and policymaking behaviour.


Studies of the political communication started during the early 1940's and have historically mostly focused on the single-country national level elections processes. Less focus has been devoted to election processes on local, regional or European level as well as comparisons between several states. In political communication research, the elections are therefore categorised in two groups: first and second-order (national elections) - FOE and SOE. Starting from this point of view is that all elections aimed towards national institutions such as national parliaments are considered to be part of the first-order national elections. This approach which in political science can also be described as sort of hierarchy where elections for national governance are considered as the most important, influential and demanding ones meaning that they are on the top of the ranking scale. However, at the same time, this approach in the research of political communication is also regarded as problematic. This is because the political communication is shaped and driven by different issues and factors at the different levels of governance.


A more appropriate way to conduct research about political communication during EP-elections would be to include the individual as well as organisational, institutional and systemic levels of analysis, and the linkages between the different levels of analysis. In practice, it means that the elections, which currently are considered as the second-order elections, need to be analysed more as well as explored on their own terms. The EP-elections are therefore frequently discussed to assess new approaches, gain better understanding and perform an analysis of the electoral process and its conceptual framework.


One part of this discourse is how much the EP-elections actually can be categorised as “European”. The EP-elections are in political science described as being based on hybrid character because they are both national and European at the same time. Elections are based on voters influencing power by voting for politicians who are going to perform their work in the same political body at the EU-level. In this sense, as well as most member states having the same election date, the EP-elections can be classed as European. The counterpart of this definition is the national character being based on national electoral regulations, and political communication were large parts of media are focusing on national issues during EP-elections despite the fact that the powers of the EP have increased significantly across time.


For this analytical approach for the EP-electoral process the institutional development of the EP has two vital aspects. One is that the theories and conclusions about political communication at the national level cannot be assumed to be appropriate for political communication during EP-election campaigns. The second aspect is that these election campaigns offer an excellent opportunity for cross-national and EU-wide comparative research. According to researchers as Lee Kaid, Maier and Strömbäck there are at least four reasons to expand research on political communication during election campaigns for the European Parliament.


Firstly, the EP-elections are important and have become even more important over time as the powers of the EP have expanded since implementation of the Lisbon Treaty and increased integration of the EU.

Secondly, they offer excellent opportunities to explore the linkages between the EU and the national character of these elections. This means that it is interesting to study how the national political parties are performing the political communication during the electoral process.

Thirdly, there is a need to expand cross-national and comparative research by studying the electoral process in different member states in order to explore similarities and differences.


And last, these elections allow the testing of theories initially developed in the context of national elections and national political communication in a multi-cultural context. 



In the next post, I will write about Reif and Schmitt’s Second-Order Elections (SEO) theory. 

måndag 13 februari 2017

Intro: The role of political communication in European Parliament elections analysis



In political science the benchmark of the research regarding European Parliament (EP) elections is to define and analyse the electoral process as the second-order (national) elections. This perception is based on the second-order election (SOE) theoretical framework and its analytical model developed by the political scientists Karlheinz Reif and Herman Schmitt in the 1980’s.  The SOE theory is still regarded as the primary academic approach and has been used for most EP-election studies since it was developed.


One of the most vital parts of the theory is the “less is at stake” dimension. According to the theory the EP-electoral process (union/regional level) is not regarded as important as a national (state level) electoral process by political actors such as voters or political parties. However, at the same time, contemporary research is providing new conclusions which are establishing an intellectual challenge for the present theoretical understanding of the EP-electoral process. Among them are the findings that the last elections for the EP are showing an increased importance of the “EU-dimension” among the political actors and voters.


One example of such development can be found in the EP-elections process in Sweden in 2014 which I have been focusing on. According to the original theoretical approach of Reif and Schmitt the political parties should mainly provide political communication based on the national level politics rather than on the EU-level politics. There are also four main characteristics which are regarded as typical for the EP-elections process:


a)       Lower level of participation among the voters

b)       Brighter prospects for small and new political parties

c)       Higher percentage of invalidated ballots

d)       Losses for parties in government.


However, the original analytical approach of the SOE theory does not include the assessment of political communication. This is one of the reasons the current theoretical and analytical approach insisting that the national elections are of the first-order importance while other elections are of the second-order importance has come under critique during the last years.


The discussion about the approach of Reif and Schmitt provided me with interest to contribute to the discussion by analyzing the EP-elections in Sweden during 2014. Therefore I decided to study political communication among the eight political parties which are represented in the Swedish parliament. The limitation of the study is based on each of the parties’ electoral manifestos for the EP-elections. 


There is a significant amount of research papers, from the period of the earlier 2000s and the early period of the 2010's, providing conclusions about the so-called ”Europeanization” process of national political parties in Sweden. The existing research also provides conclusions concerning how the national political parties are communicating with voters regarding EU-level related issues and policies before or during the national election process. The research process for this paper was therefore based on the following research question:


How will the addition of political communication aspect affect the analytical model of the SOE theory?


This is something I am going to write more about in the following texts.





onsdag 8 februari 2017

The role of political communication in European Parliament elections analysis

Between the period of September 2014 and June 2016 I was a post-graduate student of European Studies at the University of Latvia. Spending almost two years of my life in Riga was one of my best life experiences and meaningful periods. The program later enabled me to come to Manipal University and to work as an Assistant Professor in European Studies. At the moment I am teaching a course about Common Foreign and Security Policy, and before the end of this semester I will organise one more course about relations between the EU and Asia. 


Before leaving Riga I defended my thesis under the name "The role of political communication in European Parliament elections analysis." Before starting the work with the argument I was advised by my mentor Professor Tatjana Muravska to work on some topic where I could use my knowledge of the Swedish language. Inspiration for the study was partly based on my own experience as an electoral worker for the Liberal party during the European Parliament elections in 2014. Another and more vital inspiration was a book about political communication in EP elections written by Michaela Maier, Jesper Strömbäck, Lynda Lee Kaid . Also, another essential inspiration was an article published by the Swedish Institute for European Politics Studies - SIEPS - which stated that participation for EP-elections rose up during the last three EP-elections in Sweden. This provided me with interest to analyse the EP-elections in 2014 with a closer focus on the political communication among the eight political parties represented in the Riksdag, Swedish parliament. 



My master thesis The role of political communication in the European Parliament elections analysis can be downloaded here. Enjoy the reading, and please provide me with feedback if you are interested. 

torsdag 2 februari 2017

Pakrac clash

On the 31 December 1990 a large number of politicians in Yugoslavia wished Happy New Year to the citizens and also expressed their hopes for the upcoming year. However, the New Year celebration became the last one to be celebrated in the country called, with its full name, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The New Year was celebrated during a period which by many in the Yugoslav society was experienced as politically depressing, worrying and pessimistic. By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990’s Yugoslavia was influenced by various internal and external crisis which culminated in the collapse of the federation. Except for the problems of economy and governance, society’s development was influenced by growing ethno-nationalism among the different ethnic groups. Political discussions about reforms regarding centralised or decentralised and federal or confederal style of governance was by many seen as a polarising issue.

Before the collapse of Yugoslavia the state was more or less functioning as a confederation and was a global exception by being the world’s only federation without being a democracy. During the year 1990, the political conflict between the nationalists in Serbia and Croatia became more intensified. This was not only regarding the view of governance where Croat nationalists were more in favour of decentralization and confederalism while Serb nationalists were more in favour of centralization and federalism. The political conflict was also based on the political tensions in for of identity politics between the Serbs and Croats in Croatia.


One historical point that often is presented as one of the more important ones when explaining the collapse of Yugoslavia is the fighting or the clash that took place in the municipality of Pakrac on the 2 March 1991. The incident was between the Croatian special policemen and Croatian Serb paramilitaries. It ended without death casualties and by the action of the Yugoslav federal army taking over a temporary control over the municipality. The aim of this text is to connect this occasion to a more central development which explains the reasons behind the wars in ex-Yugoslavia.


Development of Serb nationalism in Croatia

Serb Democratic Party (SDS) with Serb nationalism as the main part of the political agenda, was established in the contemporary Socialist Republic of Croatia in February 1990. The party had initially a strong support in the province of Slavonia (not to be mixed with Slovenia) in those parts of the province where ethnic Serbs where consisting large or majoritarian part of the local population. One of the most famous and influential party members Milan Babic participated at the meeting in the city of Knin on the 17th February 1990. Later in Knin he was elected as a city mayor. The central aspect of the SDS:s political declaration at the meeting in Knin was that Serbs in Croatia where under threat of genocide, that the regional and local administrative borders should be changed and redrawn in accordance with the ethnic composition, and that territories with a “special ethnic composition” had the right to proclaim themselves as autonomous after process of local referendums.[1]


Pakrac municipality was the only one in Western Slavonia where the Serbs consisted majority of the local population’s ethnic composition. In Pakrac the local SDS leader was Veljko Dzakula, regarded as one of the most important persons in the party. One of his famous statements was that
if “Croatia leaves Yugoslavia, and it is working on that daily, then Serbs will secede from Croatia”.[2]






Source: ICTY 




Croat nationalism and the first democratic and multi-party elections

The first democratic and multi-party elections for the Croatian parliament were held in April and May 1990. The first democratically elected parliament came mostly to be consisted by the Croatian nationalist party Croatian Democratic Union – HDZ  (today a party often labelled as a right-wing, conservative, centre-right party and member party of European Peoples Party). On the second place were the reformed communists and among other political actors were the social-liberals and SDS. Leader of the HDZ was the former army officer and historian Franjo Tudjman who also had a history of being imprisoned for nationalistic rhetoric during the 1970’s. Because of the 40% of the votes, his party was able to form the government.


Note that both SDS and HDZ were presenting themselves as “democratic” parties. In the case of Yugoslavia nationalism was mostly used in order to promote hate and distrust against another ethnic group, a process resulting in “feeding” the fear in the society. After the first elections, Tudjman's government started with a row of actions which were regarded as discriminating by the large parts of Croatian Serb population. Robert Zimmerman, ambassador of USA, wrote in his diary about meeting with Tudjman during the 90’s how Tudjman and other leading nationalistic politicians were open with racist statements about the Serbs.






To the left - Franjo Tudjman, leader of HDZ. To the right, Milan Babic one of the leaders of  SDS. Source: Wikipedia


The new government introduced among other actions a higher degree of control over state and private media, a process that included language purism where “Croatian words” would be used. Another part of the process was that individuals who were regarded as disloyal towards the government, Serbs or born in “mixed marriages” at large numbers were forced away from their jobs from the state television, radio and security institutions. Other aspects that were experienced as provocation among the Serb nationalists were the decisions to introduce a new flag which for many reminded of the pro-Nazi German World War 2 Ustasha regime flag. Another central example was the introduction of a new constitution which meant that Serbs were no longer recognized as constitutional group and instead recognized as a minority group. In overall, the political communication of HDZ during 1990 was more and more perceived as separatist and in favour of Croatia becoming an independent state. The new constitution also included texts that in practice meant that Croatia could proclaim itself as an independent state with more than 2/3 of the votes in the parliament. During the proclamation of the new constitution members of SDS acted by leaving the parliament in a protest. [3]



”Beam revolution” 

On the August 17th, the Yugoslav air force stopped three helicopters from Croatia’s ministry of interior. The helicopters were transporting special policemen to Knin. The chief of the general staff Blagoje Adzic reported to prime minister Stipe Mesic (member of HDZ party) that the federal army would intervene if the helicopters did not fly back.

The reason why the Croatian ministry of interior made the decision to send in the helicopters with the special policemen was in order to remove the ”barricades”. Another important reason was to stop SDS politicians from holding local referendums about “autonomy” in relation to the republic’s constitution. This development became known as  ”balvan revolucija” meaning beam revolution since the SDS politicians and other civilians were blocking parts of the road infrastructure where Serbs were in the majority.

The eastern and south-eastern parts of Croatia were during this time called “Krajina”. The name means “end “ or “area” and has historical origin from the time of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Inside of the Yugoslav federal army (JNA) to act against the armed ethnic Serb civilians but the proposal was dismissed by the defence minister, general and federal “secretary for peoples defence” Veljko Kadijevic. However, he did order an investigation about both Serb and Croat armed groups.




     One of beam barricades in Knin area. On the left, a Serb flag is seen and the “four S” which stand for “only unity saves the Serbs” Source: Sibenik.in 



By Tudjman's government the whole development was seen as a threat against the authority of the state and against the tourism business because the transport networks were put under obstacle, obstructed or stopped. For Serb nationalists the development is seen as a way to show political disappointment towards Tudjman government and as a sign that the federal government in Belgrade was on their side.



Development in Pakrac

Already during the latter part of 1990, there were armed groups organized by the SDS in Pakrac area equipped with both military and hunting arms. At the same time the situation in both Pakrac and several other places was in such order where the paramilitaries often had a shortage of arms meaning that there were cases where the majority of the personnel could be unarmed.

In the beginning of February 1991 in Pakrac area there were minor but this time more equipped paramilitary units organized by SDS. These units were usually consisted of men in age 18-60 and included members of the SDS, as well as ex-military and police personnel. The arms were usually hunting rifles and also older type of weaponry from WWII such as sub-machine guns. A minor part of the weaponry was provided by the JNA. Between February and August 1991 meetings of the local SDS-members were regularly held in the village of Kukanjevac.

Before the shooting took place on the 1st March a meeting was held between the representatives of the SNV (Serb National Council) and SR Serbia’s minister for Serbs outside of Serbia Stanko Cvijan. According to the sources used during the trial procedure at the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and what was written in Yugoslavia’s official documentation regarding the situation Croatia, Cvijan and the local Serb nationalist were discussing about importance for the Serbs not to “provoke” the conflict. Only if the Serbs were attacked by the “HDZ forces” the army would intervene and “protect” the Serbs.[4]




                                                                      Source: ICTY 



The strategy among the Serb nationalists was based on a step by step process of taking control over the local societies in order to integrate them into larger political units. During the second half of 1990 those municipalities in which SDS was in power were proclaimed as “Serb municipalities”. After that the decisions were taken to integrate them into ”SAO” territorial units, meaning Serb Autonomous Area. The decision that Pakrac would be ”annexed” to SAO Krajina was taken on the 22nd of February 1991. On the same day, the decision was also taken to rename the police station in Pakrac from “Pakrac Police Station” to “Internal Secretariat for Pakrac municipality”.[5] 


Finally when war was already taking place during summer and autumn of 1991 the SAO:s units were integrated into a larger territorial unit called Republika Srpska Krajina – Serb Republic of Krajina, often called for Kninska Krajina or RSK. The “RSK” came to comprehend around one-third of the territory of today’s Republic of Croatia. RSK existed from autumn of 1991 until the summer of 1995. It was never recognized by any other sovereign state, not even by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during Milosevic government. Milan Babic was the first president of RSK and was put on trial after the war accused of war crimes by the ICTY. He was sentenced to 13 years prison sentence and spend his last days in the prison when he died on 5th of March 2006.





The municipality of Pakrac is based in Western Slavonia. Serb Republic of Krajina comprehended during the period 1991-95 around one-third of the territory of today’s Croatia. As a political and territorial unit, it ceased to exist in August of 1995 after the operation “Oluja” (Storm) by Croatian armed and police forces. Source:  Wikipedia



The role of the JNA

JNA- the Yugoslav People’s Army (also known as the federal army) had two official assignments as a state institution – one internal and one external. The external institutional assignment was to act against a conventional or unconventional counterpart in case of war or violations on the territory of the state. The internal assignment was to function as a “state holding” institution in order to be used for social coherence, against actors considered as hostile toward the state, and for occasions as natural catastrophes. 


Within the JNA leadership during the beginning of the 1990’s there was a high degree of opposition and hostility against the new governments in Slovenia and Croatia which were perceived as separatist. One aspect that was perceived as problematic was that Tudjman’s government was developing and equipping Croatia’s police and security forces. This was seen as hostile actions, sign of separatism and being against the political structure and existence of the Yugoslav federation.


At the same time JNA was during 1990 acting in such way by presenting itself as a “neutral” actor by referring to its role as an institution that was representing all the Yugoslavs and keeping the country unified. This was one of the reasons why JNA in many situations as during the beam revolution did not want to present itself as a federal institution that was on the side of Serb nationalists. However, one thing that JNA did during May of 1990 was to order to Croatian state to hand over all the weapons and ammunition in hands of republic’s Teritorijalna Odbrana (TO-Territorial Defence) to the JNA. Large parts of weapons and ammunition was moved to JNA storages in places where the Serbs were the majoritarian population.

  

The role of the DB

In Yugoslavia every republic had its own security service. One factor that has been described for having a central role in the conflict between Serbia and Croatia was the DB which stands for Državna bezbednost and was SR Serbia’s security agency. One of the assignments was to equip the para-military units organized by SDS with both weapons and other equipment as radio-stations. The period of August to September of 1990 was marked by personnel of DB being stationed in several parts of Croatia conducting such operations.


In other cases the SDS para-militaries often got assistance from the local police where Serbs were in majority. In order to equip and arm the whole units weapons and other equipment were “ordered from Belgrade”. During the ICTY:s trials it was noted that deliveries of weapons, equipment and training of personnel were activates organized “on the place” by consultation with JNA officers and from local storages. Another assignment of DB was to gather information and report to the ministry in Belgrade about the political development in different parts of Croatia and to coordinate the activities with SDS members and local JNA officers. DB operators Franko ”Frenki” Simatovic och Jovica Stanisic were among those who were regarded as the most influential ones. Both were accused of war crimes by ICTY but were released in 2013. [6] 



The ”clash” in Pakrac

On the 1st March, Pakrac’s police station was taken under control by the Serb paramilitary personnel. Around 20 policemen who were Croats were taken into custody. The process took place without any casualties and Serb paramilitaries obtained also the weaponry from the policy station. By having both the policy station and the municipality building under their command the SDS leaders were waiting for new orders. The reaction from the Croatian authorities were very fast. Already during the spring and summer of 1990 the internal security forces were involved in different police actions in areas where Serbs were in majority or large part of the population. These actions were seen in negative terms by nationalists in Serbia. During 1990 media actors in Serbia and Croatia, especially those with connections to the respective governments, were publishing negative statements about respective republics and ethnic groups.


In beginning of 1991 there were around 3 000 special policemen under control of  Croatia’s government. These were organized in 12 special police battalions which reminded more of a military-type rather than a civilian type of organization. Among them was the anti-terrorist unit Lučko that is still existing today. Early during the night, around 04:30, on the 2nd March around 200 special policemen equipped with armoured cars arrived in Pakrac. One of the leading commanders was Mladen Markac convicted by the ICTY in 2011 to 18-year prison sentence for war crimes but released already in 2012. Their primary assignment was to take control of the police station and municipality building. After several hours both of the assignments were accomplished and the municipality was officially under the control from the government in Zagreb. During the clash around 180 persons were arrested by the special policemen, many of them who were members of SDS. [7]









   Croatian special policemen outside of the police station in Pakrac on 2nd March 1991. The Croatian flag was removed from the building just one day before this picture was taken. Source: Wikipedia  


The whole situation was experienced as escalating and very problematic for the federal government which decided to act by ordering the army to intervene in order to exercise authority and to act as a ”wall” between the Croatian internal forces and Serb paramilitary. Intervention by the army was called in by Borislav Jovic, a politician from Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (nationalists) since Serbia during 1991 had the chairmanship over the Yugoslav presidency. When the army units arrived in the city the situation was perceived as stable. The Croatian special policemen and the JNA-personnel were stationed in different parts of the area but also sometimes at close distance from each other.


However, the arrival of the army had another effect on the Serb paramilitaries. Those who were not arrested and took cover in the nearby woods under the command of the local policeman Jovo Vezmar started feeling encouraged by the arrival of JNA. Vezmar was later arrested for treason but was never processed fully. It has been argued that Vezmar and his personnel interpreted the arrival of the army as a sign for army being on their side, making them more encouraged to act against the special policemen. Therefore they opened fire against the policemen who were stationed on the streets, openly and without being in cover. Three special policemen were injured with both light and heavy injuries [8].




             Croatian special policemen in Pakrac 2nd March 1991 . 
Source: Wikicommons 



Aftermath

The verbal reactions by Tudjman were mixed. Partly he said that those who were organizing the “coup” had the ambition to reintroduce the “Bolshevist socialism”. At the same time, he and other representatives of the government were making statements that the presence of JNA was justified because the army had planned exercises in the area since before and in order to “assist the internal forces to reinstate order”. Also, Mesic who at the moment was the representative of Croatia in the Yugoslav presidency made statements that the assignment of the army was to protect the republic. He began under 2nd March to discuss with local JNA commanders and developed an agreement that JNA would be stationed in the city while the special policemen would withdraw on 3rd March. After the clash, the “everyday life” went back to its normal and JNA personnel was conducting patrols in the city. 


After large numbers of individuals who were members of SDS were arrested by Croatian special policemen the negotiation process was started between the SDS party and Tudjman’s government. Also, the USA ambassador Zimmerman participated and had meetings with SDS members including Dzakula who said that Serbs had not “succeeded from Croatia” and that they did not saw “succession as the only desirable or acceptable solution”. SDS-representatives highlighted several times that Serbs wanted to continue living in Croatia but only in a “democratic Croatia within the Yugoslav federation”. [9] 


It has been considered that the meeting between the SDS and Croatian government led to de-escalation of the crisis in Pakrac. [10] Another important reason was the intervention of JNA. The army was able to take positions in and around the city. After the Pakrac clash, Babic and Milosevic met in Belgrade where they discussed the situation in Krajina. Babic was demanding that Serbia would “protect Krajina” while Milosevic reassured him not to worry. The leadership in Belgrade, just as in Zagreb, used the situation for its own interests. With the help of regime friendly media, several statements were made that Croatia’s government was threating the Serbs, using “fascist methods” and that Croatia should be disarmed by force. Many media actors reported that in all-around 6 up to 40 persons were killed in Pakrac despite the total amount of dead being equal to zero. 


During the period of May to June 1991 local referendums were taking place with agenda if these areas should continue to remain part of Yugoslavia and break away from Croatia. These referendums were organized by SDS and many of the party members later participated in military actions together with JNA against the Croat government.  Developments in the municipality of Pakrac were very similar to other local scenarios that resulted in the break out of the war. The process was based on the model where the JNA would perform interventions in parts of Croatia in order to “preserve the peace” and “prevent civil war”. [11]






Armoured fighting vehicle and armoured car from JNA on patrol through Pakrac. Croatian special policemen are standing to the right. Source: Wikicommons 



The police station in Pakrac was attacked once more in August of 1991.  The Serb forces took the municipality by force and soon afterwards had to retreat when the Croatian forces retook the control over the town. During the early autumn, Pakrac became once again under Serb control and remained as part of RSK until May 1995. In the ICTY report from 2001, it was stated that around 176 civilians were killed in Pakrac during the fighting in 1991, many who were killed with “cold weapons” as knives and axes. .[12] 




References 



[1] The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Case No. IT-03-72-I. The Prosecutor VS Milan Babic. Publiceringsdatum: Okänd. Nedladdat: 2016-07-15. Webbplats: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/custom4/en/plea_fact.pdf  s.4-5
[2] Hayball Harry Jack, Serbia and the Serbian Rebellion in Croatia (1990-1991). Publiceringsdatum: Okänd. Nedladdat: 2016-07-15. Webbplats: https://research.gold.ac.uk/12301/ s.65-66
[3] Princenton. Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution. Croatia 1990. Publiceringsdatum: Okänd. Nedladdat: 2016-09-20. Webbplats: https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/reports/croatia1990.html 
[4] Hayball, s.208-209
[5] International Court of Justice. Case Concerning. The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. (Croatia v. Yugoslavia). Memorial of Republic of Croatia. Annexes. Regional Files. Volume 2. Part II. Western Slavonia and Banovina. 1 March 2001. s.171
[6] S.245
[7] Ramet P. Sabrina. The Three Yugoslavia: State-building and Legitimation, 1918-2005. (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2006) s.384
[8] Los Angeles Times. Clash May Have Eased Yugoslav Civil War Threat : Balkans: Tensions remain between Croats and Serbs. But officials' cooperative statements suggest they hope to avoid a larger conflict. Publiceringsdatum: Okänt. Nedladdat: 2016-09-20. Webbplats: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-05/news/mn-250_1_civil-war
[9] ICJ s.66
[10] Caspersen, Nina Fallentin. Intra-ethnic competition and intra-ethnic conflict: Serb elites in Croatia and Bosnia 1990-1995. Publiceringsdatum: Okänd. Nedladdat: 2016-07-15. Webbplats: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1907/  s.76
[11] s.198
[12] S.173-178