Lessons from the Great War - Trench warfare developments in Swedish army during the WWI . Part IV - Study commission Munck

Study commission Munck and its relevance for the so-called Proposal for instruction for trench warfare.

During the summer of 1917, a new draft publication for trench warfare was published and provided to the army units. The name of the publication was Förslag till instruktion för strid om befästa ställningar which means Proposal for instruction for trench warfare. The proposal for instruction was mainly based on war experiences from the German army on the Eastern front. The so-called study commission Munck consisting of five officers was on a study tour in Germany during April and May of 1916. The following officers were Major general Munck who at the time was the Inspector for Cavalry, Colonel Bouveng from the infantry, Colonel Hammarskiöld from the artillery, Horse master von der Lancken who also was from the Cavalry Inspection and Captain Ericsson from the Fortification.

According to the study instruction, the main objects for the study commission was to study German army organisation for training of the so-called depot troops, substitution of personnel and horses, training of officer replacements and material issues.[1]

Study commission Munck. From left to right: Ericsson, Bouveng, Munck, Hammarskiöld, Améen , Von der Lancken. 

From reports written by Bouveng and Hammarskiöld

Colonel Bouveng wrote in his report that he requested from German military be provided with regulations for trench combat but that the request was denied since the regulations were considered as classified. Instead he was able to gather information at a training depot near Warsaw through conversation with a German officer who he gave Bouveng a summary of directives that were issued by the depot commander. The gathered information from directives about trench warfare included regulations for an infantry company, its disposal in the trenches, reconnaissance assignments and attack on and defence of a fortified position. According to Bouveng’s report, huge attacks were only possible with enough artillery preparation and by different assignments for the attacking troops which during attack would consist of different groups such as pioneers and hand grenade throwers. Regarding the defence of fortified position, it was to be based around the forward (first) defence line where Bouveng wrote that it was ones holy duty to fight and hold the position.[2] A such statement should be seen as reflection of contemporary German army tactics for trench warfare in which during defence combat it was considered that the first defence line was to be defended at all cost.

Colonel Hammarskiölds wrote in his report that the study commission during its activity had contact with a great number of experts and that it also was at the same time hard to gather real information because of the war where new adoptions took place all the time  and who were interpreted and performed in different ways.[3] In a chapter about artillery tactics he presented the latest combat experiences where he wrote that the infantry attack was not possible without artillery support and that howitzers were to be used for fire support during attack while canons were more suitable for artillery fire during defence.[4] Also, he wrote about that artillery was supposed to be under command of one artillery commander where the artillery was to be organized according to different types of artillery for different firing assignments.[5] Another experience was that direction of artillery fire was to be planned before the attack which was not a method used before the war.[6] On that way, a stronger element of surprise could be achieved.

---

[1] KrA, generalstaben, utrikesavdelningen, f.d. hemliga arkiv, serie E I g, vol 52 B, 1916-1917. Munck: Svenska Studiekommissionens Rapport öfver ersättningsväsendet i Tyskland 1916.

[2] Ibid, Bouvengs report s.35-43.

[3] Ibid, Hammarskiölds rapport s.1-2. Even Bouveng wrote that different units on different part of the front and with different time since arrival to the front had different combat experiences.

[4] Ibid s.42-44. The German terms used here were stürmfeur (storm-fire) used during the attack while sperrfuer (swipe/locking fire) was used during the defence. 

[5] Ibid s.44-47. Information was taken from a lecture held at the Artillery School in Jüteborg held by a former artillery commander. 

[6] Ibid s.48-49