Civilizationism instead of nationalism?

Recently I read the article ”Between nationalism and civilizationism: the European populist moment in comparative

Perspective” written by Rogers Brubaker, one of the more known experts in nationalism. In short, Brubaker argues that nationalist actors in Northen and Western parts of Europe are going beyond nationalism in their political communication. Such actors are referring to what Brubaker defines as ”civilizationism”. In such political communication, as a religion, Islam is seen not only as a threat to a political community as a nation but also to what is understood as ”our civilisation”. Brubaker argues that this kind of communication consists”identitarian Christianism”, secularism and liberalism that are combined in the national populist narratives.

The contemporary right-wing or national populism in Europe is often based on the two sides of ”us and them” world views. In the vertical dimension, it is about the narrative of ”people vs elite” by using expressions such as political correctness or corrupted elite. While in the horizontal dimension it is about aspects that are seen as ”against our way of life” as immigrants, Muslims, globalization, EU. These narratives are also combined by for example presenting ”the elite” as ”careless cosmopolitans” or as ”traitors” who favour refugees instead of ”our own people”. Much of such combined narratives is relating to views on Islam and Muslims. Brubaker argues that the shift from nationalism to civilizationism is based on such views and perceptions, where Islam is seen as a ”civilization threat”.

One of the early developments took place in Netherlands, with Pim Fortuyn, one of the most famous populist political actors in Europe. Fortuyn combined anti-Islam, or in modern sense islamophobic rhetoric, with sociocultural liberalism. He referred to himself as ”Samuel Huntington of Dutch politics” and spoke about ”clash of civilizations. His perceptions were based on forming views about European Christian identity while at the same time embracing secularism, liberal values, gay rights, gender equality, freedom of expression. Brubaker writes that the concept of civilizationism is using and presenting Christianity, secularism, and liberalism in the following ways:

a) Christianity = not as a religion but as a civilizational identity opposed to Islam

b) Secularism = as a way of minimizing the visibility of Islam in the public sphere.

c) Liberalism = gender equality or freedom of speech as  “our” way of life in opposition to Islam. 

A similar case can be observed in France. Historically the Front Nationale party was using antisemitism in its political communication while the current leader Marine Le Pen has adopted an Islamophobic stance. For example, the NF communicates about ”Christian values” while at the same time embracing secularism, the lacité, often with references about Islam and Muslims presented as a problem for a secular society. Brubaker writes that such political communication as in France and Netherlands is taking place in parts of Europe, as the North and Western Europe, which are considered to be among the most secularized and non-religious regions in the world. One explanation is that many Europeans equate secularism with modernity while religiosity is equated to backwardness. Christianity among the European national populists is not seen as a religion but as a ”secularized Christianity culture” and as ”identitarian or civilizational Christianism”. In the sense that if ”they are Muslims, we have to be Christians”. Basically, Christianity is not presented as in opposition to secularism. It is presented in combination with secularism as opposed to Islam.

Brubaker also writes about political shifts when it comes to secularism. Historically secularism was more connected to socialist and liberal actors while the conservative ones favoured religiosity. Today in Europe, communication about secularism is more connected to right-wing actors while left-wing and or liberal ones are often in favour of social harmony and religious diversity. Or when it comes to symbols and practices in the public sphere. For example, in France, the NF is presenting itself as a secularist party, despite its own history of being a party against secularism and in favour of a Christian country, society. The party has been communicating about perceived problems with Muslims openly praying on the streets, halal meat or with women with headscarves.

Liberalism is also being used by national populists. The transformation of several national populist actors as in Austria or France has been a shift from antisemitism to philosemitism and also by presenting themselves as committed to aspects as gender equality and women’s rights. In practice it means that Jews are now presented as fellow Europeans who, as well as women, are under threat from Islam. Gender equality is often presented as a national value that has to be defended from the outsiders, Muslims. Above the nationalist views, there are also civilizaionist ones where gender equality is presented as a European, Western, or even as Christian values in opposition to Islam. 

Another case of such communication is what today is called homonationalism. It is about communicating about the need to protect the gay population from Muslims or homophobic immigrants, where ”they” are presented as backward and intolerant while the nationalist actors present themselves in favour of tolerance, openness and civic rights. This is also an electoral strategy for nationalist actors in order to attract votes from other groups and actors in society. And last but not least, such actors present themselves as defending the freedom of speech. But it does not mean defending the freedom of speech in general, instead, it is about standing up for freedom of speech when the communication is directed towards or against Muslims.

What is important to be mentioned is that Brubakers description is limited and focusing on North-West European national populists. In comparison between the NWE populists and those in Central Europe as in Hungary and Poland or as with the case of Trumpism, there are considerable differences. For example, when it comes to the views on liberalism. For more information and knowledge, click here in order to download Brubaker’s article.

Neo-functionalism and early intergovernmentalism

In this series of texts, I am writing about my research regarding the contemporary debate when it comes to the neo-functionalist regional integration theory.

When it comes to the development of the spillover effects, the neo-functionalism has been based on the prediction that interaction between sectoral spillovers would lead to the political spillover resulting in the new methods of governance. When looking on the development from European Coal and Steel Community to EU the neo-functionalism have in several ways “predicted” the integration process.  Not only when it comes to economic governance but also to the geographical aspects. Haas also argued that cooperation between one group of member states would lead to other states “joining the club”.[1]

For the neo-functionalism this was confirmed during the beginning of 70’s when the UK, Denmark and Ireland became member states of the European Economic Community. However, during the earlier Cold War period, the neo-functionalism became questioned during several occasions. One example has manifested in the political behaviour of the French president Charles de Gaulle, who on two occasions vetoed UK application for the membership (1963 and 1967). During 1965 there was a case of “the empty chair crisis”, with France not being officially represented in Council’s meetings, marked by de Gaulle’s intergovernmentalist approach and resistance towards supranationalism. Basically, France was absent from the meetings within the Council of Ministers as a protest to what was perceived as a centralised majority voting system.  The “crisis” was solved by the so-called “Luxembourg compromise” which meant more intergovernmentalist form of governance. Institutional powers of the Council were increased but with unanimity as basis for decision-making process. The member states were also given veto rights to be able to veto proposals from the commission. This development also leads to the idea of Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) not being developed as a supranational one and instead being developed into intergovernmental one.

The 70’s marked the end of Europe’s “Golden Age” period of economic development starting from the middle of the 1950’s.[2] Namely, during the economic, financial and social developments in the 70’s, such as the oil crisis in 1973 and Bretton Woods, the financial system was dismantled, and protectionist measures and temptations became more politically popular in the community. The period from the middle 1970s until the first part of 1980s became later famous as the “Euroclesoris”. The community’s development was often regarded as stagnating but not as disintegrating. Among the problems for the neo-functionalist theory were the “deadlocks” of the Council meetings and institutional relations with the UK as well as that the political development of the community was often based on the political disagreements.[3] It was during this period and “spirit of the time” that the intergovernmentalist theoretical approach started to be developed and gain popularity.

Stanley Hoffmann, through his intergovernmentalist critique of the neo-functionalism approach, emphasised the importance of the national governments and their political roles in shaping the community’s structure, governance and decision-making process.[4] One of Hoffman’s arguments was that national governments would always endorse their interests within the polity. He also argued that the logic of political diversity limited the spillover effects, implicating that the neo-functionalism had its limitations. Hoffmann also highlighted the dichotomy between low politics and high politics. In low politics, such as economy, the national governments were more interested in transferring sovereignty to a supranational institutional, while in high politics, for an example foreign policy, the development was the opposite one.

For the neo-functionalism, this became visible when it comes to the aspects of political behaviour of the governments of the new member states as Ireland, Denmark and the UK, as the states were more interested in persevering sovereignty over what they regarded as “vital” interests. At the same time, during the 70’s, the neo-functionalism was marked by the formation of the European Council which had impact of further integration process and of the European Political Cooperation framework, the predecessor of Common Foreign and Security Policy.[5]

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[1] Moga p.799

[2] More  information and explanation of the term ”Golden age” can be found in Economic Growth in Europe Since 1945 by Nicholas Crafts, Gianni Toniolo (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1996)

[3] Moga p.800

[4] Sandholtz, Wayne & Sweet, Stone Alec. Neofunctionalism and Supranational Governance

(unabridged version). Downloaded: 2017-02-24. Publication date: 2012-01-01. Website: http://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5636&context=fss_papers  p.3. Hoffman presented that ”classical concerns” of European politics such as political worry for sovereignty and rivalry between the states, even in Western Europe, could be part of European level governance and decision-making process.

[5] Moga p.800