About me

Mitt foto
Stockholm, Sweden
My academic blog with history, primarily military history as the main theme. Please leave a comment that can be relevant and useful for the topic which you find interesting. I am writing in several languages, including English, depending on the theme and the languages of the sources. At the moment I am working as guide at Batteriet Arholma military museum in Stockholm. For further information please contact me on lauvlad89@gmail.com

måndag 13 februari 2017

Intro: The role of political communication in European Parliament elections analysis



In political science the benchmark of the research regarding European Parliament (EP) elections is to define and analyse the electoral process as the second-order (national) elections. This perception is based on the second-order election (SOE) theoretical framework and its analytical model developed by the political scientists Karlheinz Reif and Herman Schmitt in the 1980’s.  The SOE theory is still regarded as the primary academic approach and has been used for most EP-election studies since it was developed.


One of the most vital parts of the theory is the “less is at stake” dimension. According to the theory the EP-electoral process (union/regional level) is not regarded as important as a national (state level) electoral process by political actors such as voters or political parties. However, at the same time, contemporary research is providing new conclusions which are establishing an intellectual challenge for the present theoretical understanding of the EP-electoral process. Among them are the findings that the last elections for the EP are showing an increased importance of the “EU-dimension” among the political actors and voters.


One example of such development can be found in the EP-elections process in Sweden in 2014 which I have been focusing on. According to the original theoretical approach of Reif and Schmitt the political parties should mainly provide political communication based on the national level politics rather than on the EU-level politics. There are also four main characteristics which are regarded as typical for the EP-elections process:


a)       Lower level of participation among the voters

b)       Brighter prospects for small and new political parties

c)       Higher percentage of invalidated ballots

d)       Losses for parties in government.


However, the original analytical approach of the SOE theory does not include the assessment of political communication. This is one of the reasons the current theoretical and analytical approach insisting that the national elections are of the first-order importance while other elections are of the second-order importance has come under critique during the last years.


The discussion about the approach of Reif and Schmitt provided me with interest to contribute to the discussion by analyzing the EP-elections in Sweden during 2014. Therefore I decided to study political communication among the eight political parties which are represented in the Swedish parliament. The limitation of the study is based on each of the parties’ electoral manifestos for the EP-elections. 


There is a significant amount of research papers, from the period of the earlier 2000s and the early period of the 2010's, providing conclusions about the so-called ”Europeanization” process of national political parties in Sweden. The existing research also provides conclusions concerning how the national political parties are communicating with voters regarding EU-level related issues and policies before or during the national election process. The research process for this paper was therefore based on the following research question:


How will the addition of political communication aspect affect the analytical model of the SOE theory?


This is something I am going to write more about in the following texts.





onsdag 8 februari 2017

The role of political communication in European Parliament elections analysis

Between the period of September 2014 and June 2016 I was a post-graduate student of European Studies at the University of Latvia. Spending almost two years of my life in Riga was one of my best life experiences and meaningful periods. The program later enabled me to come to Manipal University and to work as an Assistant Professor in European Studies. At the moment I am teaching a course about Common Foreign and Security Policy, and before the end of this semester I will organise one more course about relations between the EU and Asia. 


Before leaving Riga I defended my thesis under the name "The role of political communication in European Parliament elections analysis." Before starting the work with the argument I was advised by my mentor Professor Tatjana Muravska to work on some topic where I could use my knowledge of the Swedish language. Inspiration for the study was partly based on my own experience as an electoral worker for the Liberal party during the European Parliament elections in 2014. Another and more vital inspiration was a book about political communication in EP elections written by Michaela Maier, Jesper Strömbäck, Lynda Lee Kaid . Also, another essential inspiration was an article published by the Swedish Institute for European Politics Studies - SIEPS - which stated that participation for EP-elections rose up during the last three EP-elections in Sweden. This provided me with interest to analyse the EP-elections in 2014 with a closer focus on the political communication among the eight political parties represented in the Riksdag, Swedish parliament. 



My master thesis The role of political communication in the European Parliament elections analysis can be downloaded here. Enjoy the reading, and please provide me with feedback if you are interested. 

torsdag 2 februari 2017

Pakrac clash

On the 31 December 1990 a large number of politicians in Yugoslavia wished Happy New Year to the citizens and also expressed their hopes for the upcoming year. However, the New Year celebration became the last one to be celebrated in the country called, with its full name, Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The New Year was celebrated during a period which by many in the Yugoslav society was experienced as politically depressing, worrying and pessimistic. By the end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990’s Yugoslavia was influenced by various internal and external crisis which culminated in the collapse of the federation. Except for the problems of economy and governance, society’s development was influenced by growing ethno-nationalism among the different ethnic groups. Political discussions about reforms regarding centralised or decentralised and federal or confederal style of governance was by many seen as a polarising issue.

Before the collapse of Yugoslavia the state was more or less functioning as a confederation and was a global exception by being the world’s only federation without being a democracy. During the year 1990, the political conflict between the nationalists in Serbia and Croatia became more intensified. This was not only regarding the view of governance where Croat nationalists were more in favour of decentralization and confederalism while Serb nationalists were more in favour of centralization and federalism. The political conflict was also based on the political tensions in for of identity politics between the Serbs and Croats in Croatia.


One historical point that often is presented as one of the more important ones when explaining the collapse of Yugoslavia is the fighting or the clash that took place in the municipality of Pakrac on the 2 March 1991. The incident was between the Croatian special policemen and Croatian Serb paramilitaries. It ended without death casualties and by the action of the Yugoslav federal army taking over a temporary control over the municipality. The aim of this text is to connect this occasion to a more central development which explains the reasons behind the wars in ex-Yugoslavia.


Development of Serb nationalism in Croatia

Serb Democratic Party (SDS) with Serb nationalism as the main part of the political agenda, was established in the contemporary Socialist Republic of Croatia in February 1990. The party had initially a strong support in the province of Slavonia (not to be mixed with Slovenia) in those parts of the province where ethnic Serbs where consisting large or majoritarian part of the local population. One of the most famous and influential party members Milan Babic participated at the meeting in the city of Knin on the 17th February 1990. Later in Knin he was elected as a city mayor. The central aspect of the SDS:s political declaration at the meeting in Knin was that Serbs in Croatia where under threat of genocide, that the regional and local administrative borders should be changed and redrawn in accordance with the ethnic composition, and that territories with a “special ethnic composition” had the right to proclaim themselves as autonomous after process of local referendums.[1]


Pakrac municipality was the only one in Western Slavonia where the Serbs consisted majority of the local population’s ethnic composition. In Pakrac the local SDS leader was Veljko Dzakula, regarded as one of the most important persons in the party. One of his famous statements was that
if “Croatia leaves Yugoslavia, and it is working on that daily, then Serbs will secede from Croatia”.[2]






Source: ICTY 




Croat nationalism and the first democratic and multi-party elections

The first democratic and multi-party elections for the Croatian parliament were held in April and May 1990. The first democratically elected parliament came mostly to be consisted by the Croatian nationalist party Croatian Democratic Union – HDZ  (today a party often labelled as a right-wing, conservative, centre-right party and member party of European Peoples Party). On the second place were the reformed communists and among other political actors were the social-liberals and SDS. Leader of the HDZ was the former army officer and historian Franjo Tudjman who also had a history of being imprisoned for nationalistic rhetoric during the 1970’s. Because of the 40% of the votes, his party was able to form the government.


Note that both SDS and HDZ were presenting themselves as “democratic” parties. In the case of Yugoslavia nationalism was mostly used in order to promote hate and distrust against another ethnic group, a process resulting in “feeding” the fear in the society. After the first elections, Tudjman's government started with a row of actions which were regarded as discriminating by the large parts of Croatian Serb population. Robert Zimmerman, ambassador of USA, wrote in his diary about meeting with Tudjman during the 90’s how Tudjman and other leading nationalistic politicians were open with racist statements about the Serbs.






To the left - Franjo Tudjman, leader of HDZ. To the right, Milan Babic one of the leaders of  SDS. Source: Wikipedia


The new government introduced among other actions a higher degree of control over state and private media, a process that included language purism where “Croatian words” would be used. Another part of the process was that individuals who were regarded as disloyal towards the government, Serbs or born in “mixed marriages” at large numbers were forced away from their jobs from the state television, radio and security institutions. Other aspects that were experienced as provocation among the Serb nationalists were the decisions to introduce a new flag which for many reminded of the pro-Nazi German World War 2 Ustasha regime flag. Another central example was the introduction of a new constitution which meant that Serbs were no longer recognized as constitutional group and instead recognized as a minority group. In overall, the political communication of HDZ during 1990 was more and more perceived as separatist and in favour of Croatia becoming an independent state. The new constitution also included texts that in practice meant that Croatia could proclaim itself as an independent state with more than 2/3 of the votes in the parliament. During the proclamation of the new constitution members of SDS acted by leaving the parliament in a protest. [3]



”Beam revolution” 

On the August 17th, the Yugoslav air force stopped three helicopters from Croatia’s ministry of interior. The helicopters were transporting special policemen to Knin. The chief of the general staff Blagoje Adzic reported to prime minister Stipe Mesic (member of HDZ party) that the federal army would intervene if the helicopters did not fly back.

The reason why the Croatian ministry of interior made the decision to send in the helicopters with the special policemen was in order to remove the ”barricades”. Another important reason was to stop SDS politicians from holding local referendums about “autonomy” in relation to the republic’s constitution. This development became known as  ”balvan revolucija” meaning beam revolution since the SDS politicians and other civilians were blocking parts of the road infrastructure where Serbs were in the majority.

The eastern and south-eastern parts of Croatia were during this time called “Krajina”. The name means “end “ or “area” and has historical origin from the time of the Austro-Hungarian empire. Inside of the Yugoslav federal army (JNA) to act against the armed ethnic Serb civilians but the proposal was dismissed by the defence minister, general and federal “secretary for peoples defence” Veljko Kadijevic. However, he did order an investigation about both Serb and Croat armed groups.




     One of beam barricades in Knin area. On the left, a Serb flag is seen and the “four S” which stand for “only unity saves the Serbs” Source: Sibenik.in 



By Tudjman's government the whole development was seen as a threat against the authority of the state and against the tourism business because the transport networks were put under obstacle, obstructed or stopped. For Serb nationalists the development is seen as a way to show political disappointment towards Tudjman government and as a sign that the federal government in Belgrade was on their side.



Development in Pakrac

Already during the latter part of 1990, there were armed groups organized by the SDS in Pakrac area equipped with both military and hunting arms. At the same time the situation in both Pakrac and several other places was in such order where the paramilitaries often had a shortage of arms meaning that there were cases where the majority of the personnel could be unarmed.

In the beginning of February 1991 in Pakrac area there were minor but this time more equipped paramilitary units organized by SDS. These units were usually consisted of men in age 18-60 and included members of the SDS, as well as ex-military and police personnel. The arms were usually hunting rifles and also older type of weaponry from WWII such as sub-machine guns. A minor part of the weaponry was provided by the JNA. Between February and August 1991 meetings of the local SDS-members were regularly held in the village of Kukanjevac.

Before the shooting took place on the 1st March a meeting was held between the representatives of the SNV (Serb National Council) and SR Serbia’s minister for Serbs outside of Serbia Stanko Cvijan. According to the sources used during the trial procedure at the International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia and what was written in Yugoslavia’s official documentation regarding the situation Croatia, Cvijan and the local Serb nationalist were discussing about importance for the Serbs not to “provoke” the conflict. Only if the Serbs were attacked by the “HDZ forces” the army would intervene and “protect” the Serbs.[4]




                                                                      Source: ICTY 



The strategy among the Serb nationalists was based on a step by step process of taking control over the local societies in order to integrate them into larger political units. During the second half of 1990 those municipalities in which SDS was in power were proclaimed as “Serb municipalities”. After that the decisions were taken to integrate them into ”SAO” territorial units, meaning Serb Autonomous Area. The decision that Pakrac would be ”annexed” to SAO Krajina was taken on the 22nd of February 1991. On the same day, the decision was also taken to rename the police station in Pakrac from “Pakrac Police Station” to “Internal Secretariat for Pakrac municipality”.[5] 


Finally when war was already taking place during summer and autumn of 1991 the SAO:s units were integrated into a larger territorial unit called Republika Srpska Krajina – Serb Republic of Krajina, often called for Kninska Krajina or RSK. The “RSK” came to comprehend around one-third of the territory of today’s Republic of Croatia. RSK existed from autumn of 1991 until the summer of 1995. It was never recognized by any other sovereign state, not even by Federal Republic of Yugoslavia during Milosevic government. Milan Babic was the first president of RSK and was put on trial after the war accused of war crimes by the ICTY. He was sentenced to 13 years prison sentence and spend his last days in the prison when he died on 5th of March 2006.





The municipality of Pakrac is based in Western Slavonia. Serb Republic of Krajina comprehended during the period 1991-95 around one-third of the territory of today’s Croatia. As a political and territorial unit, it ceased to exist in August of 1995 after the operation “Oluja” (Storm) by Croatian armed and police forces. Source:  Wikipedia



The role of the JNA

JNA- the Yugoslav People’s Army (also known as the federal army) had two official assignments as a state institution – one internal and one external. The external institutional assignment was to act against a conventional or unconventional counterpart in case of war or violations on the territory of the state. The internal assignment was to function as a “state holding” institution in order to be used for social coherence, against actors considered as hostile toward the state, and for occasions as natural catastrophes. 


Within the JNA leadership during the beginning of the 1990’s there was a high degree of opposition and hostility against the new governments in Slovenia and Croatia which were perceived as separatist. One aspect that was perceived as problematic was that Tudjman’s government was developing and equipping Croatia’s police and security forces. This was seen as hostile actions, sign of separatism and being against the political structure and existence of the Yugoslav federation.


At the same time JNA was during 1990 acting in such way by presenting itself as a “neutral” actor by referring to its role as an institution that was representing all the Yugoslavs and keeping the country unified. This was one of the reasons why JNA in many situations as during the beam revolution did not want to present itself as a federal institution that was on the side of Serb nationalists. However, one thing that JNA did during May of 1990 was to order to Croatian state to hand over all the weapons and ammunition in hands of republic’s Teritorijalna Odbrana (TO-Territorial Defence) to the JNA. Large parts of weapons and ammunition was moved to JNA storages in places where the Serbs were the majoritarian population.

  

The role of the DB

In Yugoslavia every republic had its own security service. One factor that has been described for having a central role in the conflict between Serbia and Croatia was the DB which stands for Državna bezbednost and was SR Serbia’s security agency. One of the assignments was to equip the para-military units organized by SDS with both weapons and other equipment as radio-stations. The period of August to September of 1990 was marked by personnel of DB being stationed in several parts of Croatia conducting such operations.


In other cases the SDS para-militaries often got assistance from the local police where Serbs were in majority. In order to equip and arm the whole units weapons and other equipment were “ordered from Belgrade”. During the ICTY:s trials it was noted that deliveries of weapons, equipment and training of personnel were activates organized “on the place” by consultation with JNA officers and from local storages. Another assignment of DB was to gather information and report to the ministry in Belgrade about the political development in different parts of Croatia and to coordinate the activities with SDS members and local JNA officers. DB operators Franko ”Frenki” Simatovic och Jovica Stanisic were among those who were regarded as the most influential ones. Both were accused of war crimes by ICTY but were released in 2013. [6] 



The ”clash” in Pakrac

On the 1st March, Pakrac’s police station was taken under control by the Serb paramilitary personnel. Around 20 policemen who were Croats were taken into custody. The process took place without any casualties and Serb paramilitaries obtained also the weaponry from the policy station. By having both the policy station and the municipality building under their command the SDS leaders were waiting for new orders. The reaction from the Croatian authorities were very fast. Already during the spring and summer of 1990 the internal security forces were involved in different police actions in areas where Serbs were in majority or large part of the population. These actions were seen in negative terms by nationalists in Serbia. During 1990 media actors in Serbia and Croatia, especially those with connections to the respective governments, were publishing negative statements about respective republics and ethnic groups.


In beginning of 1991 there were around 3 000 special policemen under control of  Croatia’s government. These were organized in 12 special police battalions which reminded more of a military-type rather than a civilian type of organization. Among them was the anti-terrorist unit Lučko that is still existing today. Early during the night, around 04:30, on the 2nd March around 200 special policemen equipped with armoured cars arrived in Pakrac. One of the leading commanders was Mladen Markac convicted by the ICTY in 2011 to 18-year prison sentence for war crimes but released already in 2012. Their primary assignment was to take control of the police station and municipality building. After several hours both of the assignments were accomplished and the municipality was officially under the control from the government in Zagreb. During the clash around 180 persons were arrested by the special policemen, many of them who were members of SDS. [7]









   Croatian special policemen outside of the police station in Pakrac on 2nd March 1991. The Croatian flag was removed from the building just one day before this picture was taken. Source: Wikipedia  


The whole situation was experienced as escalating and very problematic for the federal government which decided to act by ordering the army to intervene in order to exercise authority and to act as a ”wall” between the Croatian internal forces and Serb paramilitary. Intervention by the army was called in by Borislav Jovic, a politician from Milosevic’s Socialist Party of Serbia (nationalists) since Serbia during 1991 had the chairmanship over the Yugoslav presidency. When the army units arrived in the city the situation was perceived as stable. The Croatian special policemen and the JNA-personnel were stationed in different parts of the area but also sometimes at close distance from each other.


However, the arrival of the army had another effect on the Serb paramilitaries. Those who were not arrested and took cover in the nearby woods under the command of the local policeman Jovo Vezmar started feeling encouraged by the arrival of JNA. Vezmar was later arrested for treason but was never processed fully. It has been argued that Vezmar and his personnel interpreted the arrival of the army as a sign for army being on their side, making them more encouraged to act against the special policemen. Therefore they opened fire against the policemen who were stationed on the streets, openly and without being in cover. Three special policemen were injured with both light and heavy injuries [8].




             Croatian special policemen in Pakrac 2nd March 1991 . 
Source: Wikicommons 



Aftermath

The verbal reactions by Tudjman were mixed. Partly he said that those who were organizing the “coup” had the ambition to reintroduce the “Bolshevist socialism”. At the same time, he and other representatives of the government were making statements that the presence of JNA was justified because the army had planned exercises in the area since before and in order to “assist the internal forces to reinstate order”. Also, Mesic who at the moment was the representative of Croatia in the Yugoslav presidency made statements that the assignment of the army was to protect the republic. He began under 2nd March to discuss with local JNA commanders and developed an agreement that JNA would be stationed in the city while the special policemen would withdraw on 3rd March. After the clash, the “everyday life” went back to its normal and JNA personnel was conducting patrols in the city. 


After large numbers of individuals who were members of SDS were arrested by Croatian special policemen the negotiation process was started between the SDS party and Tudjman’s government. Also, the USA ambassador Zimmerman participated and had meetings with SDS members including Dzakula who said that Serbs had not “succeeded from Croatia” and that they did not saw “succession as the only desirable or acceptable solution”. SDS-representatives highlighted several times that Serbs wanted to continue living in Croatia but only in a “democratic Croatia within the Yugoslav federation”. [9] 


It has been considered that the meeting between the SDS and Croatian government led to de-escalation of the crisis in Pakrac. [10] Another important reason was the intervention of JNA. The army was able to take positions in and around the city. After the Pakrac clash, Babic and Milosevic met in Belgrade where they discussed the situation in Krajina. Babic was demanding that Serbia would “protect Krajina” while Milosevic reassured him not to worry. The leadership in Belgrade, just as in Zagreb, used the situation for its own interests. With the help of regime friendly media, several statements were made that Croatia’s government was threating the Serbs, using “fascist methods” and that Croatia should be disarmed by force. Many media actors reported that in all-around 6 up to 40 persons were killed in Pakrac despite the total amount of dead being equal to zero. 


During the period of May to June 1991 local referendums were taking place with agenda if these areas should continue to remain part of Yugoslavia and break away from Croatia. These referendums were organized by SDS and many of the party members later participated in military actions together with JNA against the Croat government.  Developments in the municipality of Pakrac were very similar to other local scenarios that resulted in the break out of the war. The process was based on the model where the JNA would perform interventions in parts of Croatia in order to “preserve the peace” and “prevent civil war”. [11]






Armoured fighting vehicle and armoured car from JNA on patrol through Pakrac. Croatian special policemen are standing to the right. Source: Wikicommons 



The police station in Pakrac was attacked once more in August of 1991.  The Serb forces took the municipality by force and soon afterwards had to retreat when the Croatian forces retook the control over the town. During the early autumn, Pakrac became once again under Serb control and remained as part of RSK until May 1995. In the ICTY report from 2001, it was stated that around 176 civilians were killed in Pakrac during the fighting in 1991, many who were killed with “cold weapons” as knives and axes. .[12] 




References 



[1] The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia. Case No. IT-03-72-I. The Prosecutor VS Milan Babic. Publiceringsdatum: Okänd. Nedladdat: 2016-07-15. Webbplats: http://www.icty.org/x/cases/babic/custom4/en/plea_fact.pdf  s.4-5
[2] Hayball Harry Jack, Serbia and the Serbian Rebellion in Croatia (1990-1991). Publiceringsdatum: Okänd. Nedladdat: 2016-07-15. Webbplats: https://research.gold.ac.uk/12301/ s.65-66
[3] Princenton. Constitution Writing and Conflict Resolution. Croatia 1990. Publiceringsdatum: Okänd. Nedladdat: 2016-09-20. Webbplats: https://www.princeton.edu/~pcwcr/reports/croatia1990.html 
[4] Hayball, s.208-209
[5] International Court of Justice. Case Concerning. The Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. (Croatia v. Yugoslavia). Memorial of Republic of Croatia. Annexes. Regional Files. Volume 2. Part II. Western Slavonia and Banovina. 1 March 2001. s.171
[6] S.245
[7] Ramet P. Sabrina. The Three Yugoslavia: State-building and Legitimation, 1918-2005. (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2006) s.384
[8] Los Angeles Times. Clash May Have Eased Yugoslav Civil War Threat : Balkans: Tensions remain between Croats and Serbs. But officials' cooperative statements suggest they hope to avoid a larger conflict. Publiceringsdatum: Okänt. Nedladdat: 2016-09-20. Webbplats: http://articles.latimes.com/1991-03-05/news/mn-250_1_civil-war
[9] ICJ s.66
[10] Caspersen, Nina Fallentin. Intra-ethnic competition and intra-ethnic conflict: Serb elites in Croatia and Bosnia 1990-1995. Publiceringsdatum: Okänd. Nedladdat: 2016-07-15. Webbplats: http://etheses.lse.ac.uk/1907/  s.76
[11] s.198
[12] S.173-178 



fredag 6 januari 2017

Globalists versus nationalists?



As a part of the US presidential elections aftermath, there is a discussion about a new political battle between globalists and nationalists. The argument is coming from the social psychologist Jonathan Haidt who is more prevalent among conservative actors. Haidt is, for example, providing a reflective and meaningful analysis about “sacred values” by comparing liberals and conservatives within the American context. However, generalising different political actors into globalists and nationalists is something else, more complicated and very narrow.



There are several reasons to question the narrative and one of them is geographical. The view that the political battle is taking place globally is challenged by the notion that the narrative itself is limited to experiences from the USA and Europe. The relevance for the narrative is thereby “Western” and does not comprehend for example the political development in large parts of Asia, South America or Africa. One explanation is that both the USA and EU are more exposed to the processes of globalization and regional integration. In the time of different crisis, the aspects such as identity, culture and migration are being regarded by the larger numbers of people as more important than socioeconomic or environmental issues.  



During the 90’s and the early globalization period a lot of argumentation was based on the political struggle among the pro-globalization and anti-globalization actors. However, those who often were labelled as anti-globalists were in many cases not against globalization but rather had the alternative views on globalization. This feature can also be observed today among the different political actors, making it harder to divide them into the two categories. For example, in Europe, the socialists are often in favour of humanitarian immigration while being against economic globalization. The liberals are often in favor of the more free immigration policies but against the sociopolitical integration.



The political differences are therefore neither between left and right nor libertarian and authoritarian. Instead, the differences are based on the views on different policy areas. Even politicians as Putin, Erdogan and Trump are, despite how they present themselves, in some degree still interested in global economy, finance and trade. Many Russian nationalists are for example in favour of Eurasian economic union and a free economic zone from “Vancouver to Vladivostok”. At the same time, while being partly in favor of economic rights, authoritarian politicians are aspiring for control over identities. They look upon human rights, liberal democracy and multicultural societies as a threat to their own monopolistic views on national identity based on nativism and myths.   



Furthermore, there are also the other methods to explain the current political dissatisfaction in EU and USA. Both societies are post-democratic in the sense that the economy is more global while democracy and sovereignty are mainly national. In the West, there is a popular view among parts of populations that globalization is a zero-sum game, that loss of influence is equal to being “weak” and that “things used to be better” before. Such views disregard the fact that American-inspired globalization during the 90’s led to the improved living standards in the other parts of the world. For countries which are now competing with the West, such as Russia and China. The EU on the other side is often presented as a paradox, as a democracy without a demos and governance without a government but still legitimized by the majority of the citizens at some degree.



Globalization effects have led to several fantastic developments such as reduced poverty, illiteracy and hunger around the world. Also, there has been a globalization of democracy such as regarding NGO: s activism, for example with the Paris agreement and the climate change policies. At the same time, despite more than twenty years of having processes of global and regional integrations, the state is still regarded as the main institution people are turning towards in the time of crisis. Even if the crisis, problems or challenges are of supranational, regional or global character. In political communication, states are often described as independent, free and sovereign. In reality, this is more complicated since the modern states, such as the EU-states, are more depending on each other by sharing freedoms and sovereignty for different purposes. The absolute majority of the states today are members of the organizations described as international regional or supranational.



Nowadays, it is very common to make statements that both EU and United Nations need to reform, but it is uncommon to hear that the states need to reform. After all both the EU and UN are results of the social contracts between the states and interests of national governments. Sociologist Ulrich Beck has argued that the states, even the nation-states, should become cosmopolitan in the future. Becks argument is that the nations can still exist and that the identification of an individual with a state or a nation is a personal thing, just as a religious identity. The state needs to function in favour of all its residents and connecting people through central aspects such as rule of law, human rights and democracy.


In order to handle regional and global problems and challenges the states have the need to cooperate, integrate and have common institutions. In many cases, due to the consequences of the crisis, there is a lack of political will for sharing more sovereignty, resources and creating new institutions. A way to reduce political dissatisfaction and to empower individual trust and influence regarding supranational governance is to have more democratic rootedness and awareness. Higher degrees of knowledge and understanding about supranational institutions is necessary in order to connect them with the citizens and to motivate eventual reforms for the 2020’s.







tisdag 3 januari 2017

Kommentar rörande "Stormaktstiden - Östersjöriket" diskussionen


Nyligen har det skrivits om i media, som i denna artikel i 
Expressen, om Skolverkets benämning av tidsperioden 1500-1700 som framgår i planerna för kurser i historia från 2011. Kritiken har sin utgångspunkt i att Skolverket har ändrat benämningen av tidsperioden från "Stormaktstiden" till "Östersjöriket". I till exempel kursplanen i historia för grundskolan årskurs 4-6 framgår just benämningen Östersjöriket samt punkter som anses vara viktiga för eleverna att gå igenom under undervisningen. 





Att benämningar inom själva historieämnet ändras med tiden är vanligt. Detta kan bero på politiska skäl med koppling till en viss politisk ideologi. Det finns massor med exempel genom historien hur historia som ämne har missbrukats, förvanskats och politiserats. Historieskrivningen i Sovjetunionen är ett vanligt förekommande exempel på sådan utveckling eftersom historieskrivningen styrdes av politiker och kommunistpartiet. Även idag pågår liknande utveckling i Ryssland. 


Förändringar kan också bero på handlingar som inte alls har koppling till en viss politisk ideologi. Initiativ som är opolitiska när andra än politiska aktörer står bakom viljan och intresset att inkludera ny fakta, korrigera och förbättra historieundervisningen. Exempel på det är beskrivningen av amerikanska indianer (formellt heter Native Americans - alltså infödda amerikaner) genom historien som har ändrats bland annat på grund av tidigare felaktigheter inklusive rasistiska föreställningar. 


I grunden är all historieskrivning en efterhandskonstruktion även om historia äger rum "här och nu". Historia är på det sättet mer än vad som har "hänt". Det brukar handla om vad som är "skrivet" om det som har hänt. Även begreppet ”stormakt” är en efterhandskonstruktion som har använts i undervisningen långt efter den berörda tidsperioden. 


Historieskrivningen och hur historia presenteras är beroende av tillgången till källor, öppenheten i samhället, kvaliteten hos forskande institutioner, tillämpningen av vetenskapliga metoder och vilka frågor som "samhället" ställer och som historieforskningen ”förväntas” besvara. Vetenskap , inklusive den formella (exempelvis universitetsbaserade) historieskrivningen handlar i första hand om att arbeta deskriptivt och ”objektivt”, det vill säga beskrivande. Utan värderingar om att det som har hänt var ”bra eller dåligt”.



Det finns samtidigt en invändning att just betrakta historien som mänsklig eller social konstruktion. Ta till exempel Förintelsen som tillkom som vetenskaplig och vardagsbegrepp, och som genom forskningen kunde fullständigare beläggas först efter andra världskriget. Även om historien om Förintelsen är "konstruerad"  så skulle det sända signaler som bland annat låter avhumaniserande. Det finns händelser som påverkat både mindre och större antal människor till en så pass hög emotionell grad som gör det svårt för historieskrivningen att hålla sig neutral eller objektiv till 100%.


Historia brukar alltså väcka känslor. Vilket gör att även en ändring av benämningen av en viss tidsperiod kan orsaka reaktioner. Som ämne har historia i modern tid, från och med 1800-talet, använts av stater och fortfarande används för att legitimera vissa aspekter. I Sverige, precis som på andra håll i Europa, blev historieundervisningen en metod att konstruera den svenska nationen. Historieundervisningen och de tidiga nationalismerna gick hand i hand. 


Benämningen på tidsperioder och händelser har också genom historien berott på hur människor värdemässigt och känslomässigt upplevt en viss händelse eller process. Politik har ofta gjort sig gällande. Ta till exempel uppmärksammandet av Segerdagen mot fascismen den 9 maj i Lettland. Bland stora delar av befolkningen men även i den formella historieskrivningen anses 1940-valet som en period av ockupation från Tysklands och Sovjetunionens sida. Under Sovjetunionens tid fick människor i Lettland lära sig att Lettland var ”befriad” och inte ockuperad. Idag används just begreppet ockupation, även för perioden efter andra världskriget alltså 1946-1991.


Historia är samtidigt en argumenterande vetenskap. Tanken med historieskrivning är inte, som ofta varit fallet med totalitära samhällen, att ändra historieskrivningen "över en natt". Om historia metaforiskt presenteras som ett hus så är historieskrivningen ett arbete att kontinuerligt måla om huset, reparera golvet eller lägga på tapeter men inte att riva ned huset och bygga ett nytt. Ändringar av formella benämningar av en viss avgränsad händelse, process eller tidsperiod måste därmed argumenteras, motiveras och rättfärdigas. I fallet om Skolverkets ändring framgår bland annat följande motivering:


”Innehållet om handel och maktstrider hänger nära samman med innehållet om det svenska och det som traditionellt brukar kallas stormaktstiden. Kunskaper om utbytet runt Östersjön i historisk tid kan ge eleverna perspektiv på det samarbete som äger rum i dag, särskilt kring gränsöverskridande frågor om miljö och migration.”


Vidare framgår det rörande ”svenska Östersjöriket” :

”Innehållet det svenska Östersjöriket samt orsakerna till dess uppkomst handlar om hur och varför Sverige under perioden utökade sitt territorium. Detta var en tid när bergsbruket tog fart och metallproduktionen ökade starkt i Norge och Sverige. Det gav den svenska staten, som tidvis kontrollerade den omfattande handeln runt Östersjön, stora inkomster. Kampen om makten över Östersjön ledde till många och långvariga krig mot andra nationer som också hade intressen i området”


Och att

” Kursplanen har valt att använda begreppet det svenska Östersjöriket istället för det mer välkända begreppet stormaktstiden. Skälet är att ordet stormaktstiden riskerar att begränsa undervisningen till att handla mest om militärhistoria.”


På det sättet har Skolverkets medarbetare motiverat att namnändringen beror på att perioden 1500-1700 i historieundervisningen tidigare handlade om och fokuserade mer på militära aspekter, som krigföring mellan staterna, än på till exempel migration och handel.  Därför borde enligt Skolverket den nya (uppdaterade) historieundervisningen ta upp fler aspekter än de militära för att eleverna ska utifrån historien kunna förstå dagens transnationella (gränsöverskridande) processer  i Östersjön, som miljö och migration. 





Personliga reflexioner

Jag är införstådd med att både formella och informella syn på historien ändras med tiden både av politiska, vetenskapliga och andra skäl. Hur människor ser på och uppfattar historia inom ramen för ett samhälle beror bland annat på vilka erfarenheter och utveckling som har ägt rum inom ramen för till exempel ett land eller en stad samt hur olika händelser, perioder eller processer värderas.

Också själva historieämnet ändras med tiden. Till exempel dagens militärhistoria handlar just om att studera relationer mellan civila och militära aspekter. På det sättet är militärhistoria idag ett civilt ämne men som från början var helt och hållet ett militärt ämne vars grundtanke var att hitta ”recept” på hur krigföring kunde bedrivas. På det sättet har även forskningen och historieundervisningen rörande Sverige och Östersjön genom tiden förändrats till att vara något bättre, precisare och vetenskapligare.


I Skolverkets fall finner jag att namnändringen har relevanta motiveringar samtidigt som jag själv inte är tillräckligt övertygad om att det är en rätt åtgärd.   Bland annat eftersom det samtida Sverige hade handelsutbyte och relationer med andra stater, delar av Europa och världen än Östersjön.  
  

Ur ”europeiskt” perspektiv, alltså utifrån forskningen om stater i 1600-talets Europa kan benämningen ”stormakt” användas för att beskriva samtida Sverige genom att hänvisa till de ekonomiska, territoriella och militära aspekterna. Även om begreppet stormaktstiden kan låta gammaldags för många så hindrar inte namnet i sig att historieundervisningen omfattar större fokus på olika aspekter.




Referenser 

Expressen. Galet av Skolverket att överge stormaktstiden. Publiceringsdatum: 2016-12-29. Nedladdat: 2017-01-03. Webbplats: http://www.expressen.se/ledare/malin-siwe/galet-av-skolverket-att-overge-stormaktstiden/


Skolverket. Kursplan-Historia Grundskolan. Publiceringsdatum: Okänd. Nedladdat: 2017-01-03. Webbplats: http://www.skolverket.se/laroplaner-amnen-och-kurser/grundskoleutbildning/grundskola/historia