Lessons from the Great War - Trench warfare developments in Swedish army during the WWI. Part VIII. Tests for a new infantry organization

After the exercises in trench warfare during the summer of 1917 the Infantry Inspection and its chief Tingsten made an analysis about the future needs for the development of infantry. According to Tingstens own words it was hard to drove a line between the trench warfare within the frame of mobile warfare and trench warfare within the frame of positional warfare. He also assumed that the training for mobile warfare was still central at the same time as it was necessary to prepare for the positional warfare as long as it was possible.

There was also a need in order to work with positional warfare to create a new organisation for the infantry training since positional warfare included special weapons and new tactics.[1] Tingsten also assumed that the experiences from the war were not sufficiently analysed in order to make a more complete analysis regarding the concept for infantry training in trench warfare. On one side the infantry had not received enough training in trench warfare during 1917 which led to the conclusion that more resources were needed for enhancing the training capabilities. On the other side, there was a discussion about how much the current training organisation was actually needed to be changed in accordance with the latest war experiences and the warfare that was developing all the time.

However, Tingsten was even putting focus on usage of mortars, flamethrowers and trench canons ant that these systems could not only be operated by personnel from artillery and engineers but even had to be handled by infantrymen. In order to perform that it was according to him necessary with field tests regarding training in trench warfare before it could be decided on how much the current training organization was needed to be modified.[2]  

Test training for trench warfare

On the 29 November 1917, a general order was published by Land defence ministry regarding the tests for training in trench warfare. The purpose was to gather more knowledge and incitements on a practical level in order to be able to make a decision for the future training organisation for the infantry during the war- and peacetime.[3]

New instructions and manuals for trench warfare were published including a proposal for instruction for usage of hand grenades.[4] In the hand grenade proposal, there was a trace of the stormtroopers tactic since it was stated that every infantry company should have a specially organized hand grenade patrols consisting of the most skilled and daring soldiers in order to solve special assignments. Exercises in hand grenade combat were to be performed in the form of cooperation between storm patrols, regular infantry and support from mortars and machine-guns.[5]

The tests were performed in three infantry regiments: I14, I15 and I17. The idea was to test three different types of unit organization. The first test was to use the current organization where a regiment had 12 rifle companies, one machine-gun company and to add a number of companies for specialised need such as medics, mortar squads, signal troops or searchlight personnel. The second and even the third case was to reduce the number of infantry companies in favour of the special companies. I 17 was also chosen for the establishment of the so-called Grenadier Company, for the training of stormtroopers / special training for trench warfare. The all three regiments were provided with 2 cm trench mortars and I 17 was for its Grenadier company provided with one flamethrower and 150 hand grenades. This occasion was probably the most organized work with the stormtroopers tactic on the practical level in the Swedish army during the WWI.

 "Granatenwerfer" was a German trench mortar usually used on low level by platoons or companies. It could be handled by two-three soldiers depending on the situation. Swedish army was provided with these during WWI.  

This was one of the first flamethrowers in the Swedish army. FM 18 was an experimental model. It was obtained in order to implement the latest experiences and equipment from the war. A big thanks to Thomas Wictor who provided me with this picture and who is one of the best flamethrower experts in the world. 

Aftermath

After the tests from beginning of February until the end of October Tingstens opinions was that the specialization of the infantry’s training for trench warfare was not needed to be driven longer than necessary. The proposal for a new educational organization for the infantry was that infantry regiments should consist of 9 rifle companies, one machine-gun company and three special companies.

One of the opinions was that stormtroopers training was to be included in regular soldier training and not in specialized units.[6] This meant that he drew the same conclusion as it was done in the German army where during the beginning of 1918.

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[1] KrA, Infanteriinspektionen, serie B I, 1917. Ang infanteriets utbildning för strid om befästa ställningar date­rad 17 okt 1917.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition, serie B I, vol. 78, generalorder 29 november 1917 nr 1593.

[4] Ibid, generalorder 12 oktober 1917 nr 1384: Beträffande utbildningen i handgranatsstrid vid infanteriet under ut­bild­ningsåret 1917-1918 och 13 oktober 1917 nr 1393: Beträffande Infanteriets utbildning inom kompani för ställningskriget under utbildningsåret 1917-1918. 

[5] Förslag till instruktion för använd­ning av handgra­nater, fastställd enligt generalorder 23 nov 1917 nr 1557, (Stockholm: Lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition, 1917), s. 17 och 22.

[6] KrA, infanteriinspektionen, serie B, Angående omläggningen av infanteriets utbildning daterad 30 okt 1918.

Lessons from the Great War - Trench warfare developments in Swedish army during the WWI . Part VII. Officers course in trench warfare

In the same period as the SGS during the autumn of 1916 proposed several measures to be conducted for the army regarding trench warfare there was also a proposal for an officer-course. The aim of the course was to educate officers in usage of hand grenades, mortars, infantry shields and other technical equipment and also about filed fortifications works and cooperation between infantry and artillery during attack and defence.[1] The course later decided to be performed during two weeks in October of 1917. The officers came mainly from the infantry and engineer units while others came from the artillery and Royal Fortification.[2] According to the course plan the main effort was placed on attack combat. Officers were even trained how to perform in a storm patrol (stormpatrull) which meant that the stormtroopers tactic was a part of the course. The course commander, Lt Col Gustaf Lillehöök who also was the chief of the Royal War Academy, was studying the stormtroopers in May of 1917 in the German and Austro-Hungarian army.

According to the report that was written after the course a conclusion can be made that the Swedish army had the latest knowledge regarding trench warfare. In one of the lectures during the course it was mentioned that trench warfare was a result consisting of development in military technology and the sizes of the armies, especially of the Great Powers. Also, it was mentioned about the risks of presuming or believing that mobile warfare had lost its importance. The developments of the war had shown that a breakthrough and mobile warfare still could be achieved.  It was also mentioned that a long term positional war in Sweden was unlikely because of the geographical reasons and political situation. It meant that Sweden was unlikely to be attacked since its neutral position and that the long borders and areas of the country meant that long lines of trenches were hard to achieve both for the attacker and defender.[3] In the end, mobile warfare was according to lecture still a necessity in the case of war.

The course meant that the knowledge in the SGS was on a very high level since it was based on the latest experiences mainly from the central powers. But when it comes to knowledge about trench warfare among the army’s officers corps it is doubtful that the level of knowledge could be considered high. Lilliehööks own opinion was that the length of the course was not enough for a deeper education. It was instead more an orientation of the latest experiences.

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[1] KrA, generalstaben, chefsexpeditionen, f.d. hemliga, serie B I. Skrivelse frånchefen för generalstaben till Konungen daterad 23 nov 1916.

[2] Lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition, f.d. hemliga arkiv, serie E I, vol 40. Underdånig rapport över kursen i ställningskrig, daterad 1 dec 1917. The course included 10 specially requested officers, 16 regimental officers, 80 company officers and 93 non-commissioned officers.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Ibid.

Lessons from the Great War - Trench warfare developments in Swedish army during the WWI . Part VI. Exercises in trench warfare

General Staff’s field service exercise in 1916

During the beginning of October 1916, a field service exercise took pace in area between Stockholm and Uppsala.[1] Comparing with the Fortification exercise from 1915, these exercises was not mainly based on trench warfare. It was rather organized for exercising attack on and defence of rapidly established entrenched positions.[2] A scenario for the exercise was based on combat between two fictive armies. Units that performed the attack on the first day of the exercises noted that the first attacking flank did not succeed because they did not use artillery while the second flank did the opposite and performed a successful attack.[3] Also, the troops where for the first time using a contemporary weapon system which was developed for trench warfare – mortar.

The commander of the engineer troops wrote in his report that the filed works were used in greater and better way compared with earlier exercises in order to meet the modern necessity and the ongoing inevitable experiences.[4] But also he wrote some negative criticism, among other things that establishment of filed fortifications often was not performed in a professional way. The troops were according to report in many cases not performing in a realistic and professional way.[5] Form the report a conclusion can be made that the Swedish army units still lacked basic knowledge about trench warfare combat.

Exercises in trench warfare during the summer of 1917

At the same time as the proposal for instruction for trench warfare was published the exercises in trench warfare were to be held. Concept for the exercises was based on using the proposal for instruction in order to exercise establishment of two fortified positions with two companies against each other. The companies were supported by machineguns and with either fictive or real artillery.[6] By that way exercises were held on company and battalion level. The duration of the exercises was around 10-12 days and they were divided in two periods. The first period was based on establishing the positions and the second period was based on exercising trench combat.

The troops were also using special weapons and systems that were particular for trench warfare: signal-pistols, hand grenades, trench mortars and wire cutters. The commanders were trained to give orders and to lead the troops during attack and defence. Also, requirements were imposed on NCO: s to use the initiative during counter-attacks.[7]

During the exercises several problems were identified. The trench works were in several cases perceived to have been established on inappropriate places and as unfinished before combat training started.[8] Many commanders lacked practical training and experience regarding trench warfare as they only had theoretical training which limited their ability to lead. The troops were in many cases performing in inadequate ways as they were not supposed to do in reality.[9] Experiences from exercises were gathered, written down and later sent to SGS.

 Some pictures from the exercises 

 References 

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[1] KrA, Generalstaben, kommunikationsavdelningen, serie F I, Fälttjänstövningar 1916, volym 51, generalorder 663, Allmänna bestämmelser.

[2] Ibid.

[3] KrA, generalstaben, chefsexpeditionen f.d. hemliga arkiv, serie E III, vol. 96.  Hugo Gadd: Fälttjänstöv­ningarna i Uppland 1916, daterad 19 december 1916.

[4] Ibid.

[5] Ibid. Observation towords the

[6] Lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition, serie B I, vol. 78, generalorder 4 juni 1917 nr 712.

[7] KrA, generalstaben, kommunikationsavdelningen, serie F I, vol 57. Övningarna i ställningskrig inom III. arméfördelningen i Axvall, II. arméfördelningen, Rapport n:r 1125 Till chefen för II. arméfördelningen.

[8] Ibid,

[9] Ibid, III. arméfördelningen, Rapport över övningarna i ställningskrig inom III. arméfördelningen å Axvall 1917 s.15-16

Proposals for instruction and exercises in trench warfare

In 1916 at the end of September Chief of General Staff Knut Bildt made a statement to the Land defence ministry regarding the needed funds for exercises where he wrote that:

Experiences from the World War are putting importance on that the troops are familiar with construction and establishment of fortified positions, that they are trained for attack on and defence of those positions, and that they understand how to manage their own ability to act in the positions and in front of them by the most practical and energy-saving way.[1]

According to the statement, it was of great importance that exercises in trench warfare already could be performed among a number of regiments during the conscription period of 1916-1917. Bildt also proposed that as a ground for exercise a proposal for instruction for trench warfare should be worked out. According to Bildt, the war had clearly shown the importance of trench warfare and the need for modern regulation for combat training. Now there was a formal call to replace the draft proposal for attack against fortifications from 1914. Bildt also proposed that this assignment was to be given to Tingsten and a number of experts.[2]

Later Tingsten informed Bildt that he agreed upon his statement and also proposed that the experts should be Bouveng, Hamamrsköld and Captain Kaijser from the Fortification since according to Tingsten all of these have studied the relevant conditions during this ongoing war.[3] In the beginning of December Tingsten and his experts were approved by the Land defence ministry.^[4] 

                        Proposal for instruction for trench warfare. 

We could not base us after the German Western front

When the proposal for instruction was approved, published and delivered to the units in June of 1917 it was based on the experiences gathered from the German army on the Eastern front. By that time the German army had changed its tactics and strategy for trench warfare. On the Western front the German army had introduced the so-called Elastic defence or Zonal defence where defence zones replaced the system with defence lines. At the same time the German Stormtrupptaktik or Stosstrupptaktik (Stormtrooper tactic) became a formal tactic within the army and was used mainly on the Eastern front. SGS had information about these developments in the German army and at the same time, the proposal for instruction was based on experience that now were seen as outdated and abandoned because of high casualties since the first line was to be defended at all cost. There also was nothing mentioned about stormtroopers in the proposal.  

According to Tingstens memories, he and the experts came to the conclusion that they could not base the proposal for instruction on the German Western front.[5] Already two months after proposal was published Tingsten wrote in an article which was published in Krigsvetenskapsakademiens tidskrift  (Royal War Academy Journal) that positional warfare hardly […] was desirable for a small nation with long borders. According to Tinsgten the fronts would become too long compared to the number which would sooner or later lead to disaster.

Another view on this topic was made by Bouveng who also published a text in Krigsvetenskapsakademiens handlingar (Royal War Academy Record) in 1917. According to him, the development based on an enormous concentration of troops and artillery on the Western front was an exception. For Swedish concerns, more general conclusions should be taken from the Eastern front, especially regarding the interaction between the mobile war and positional war.[6]

Both Tingsten and Bouveng shared the view that in case of war the Western front scenario was probably not a realistic scenario for waging war in Sweden. Reasons for that was that resources for several months of positional warfare were insufficient and that Sweden as a country with long borders was too big to defend by long lines of trenches. The difference was that Bouveng was proposing interaction between two kinds of warfare that took place during the WWI while Tingsten is in Swedish military history research considered to have been a proponent of the pre-WWI mobile warfare with encountering combat. Also, the much greater interest for the Swedish army during WWI was the Eastern front probably due to the general view that Tsarist Russia was the main potential enemy in case of war.[7]

Quite good and the best  for  the moment that was  able to be achieved

In his statement regarding the proposal for instruction before it was published Bildt concluded that it was not possible to have a clef opinions about some issues since experiences from the war were not entirely known.[8] There was neither any experience in the Swedish army about usage of the basic tactics in positional warfare since there had not been any exercises.

Characteristics of the proposal for instruction for trench warfare

During a long time, a defence area was supposed to have consisted of one position that was called main position. If there was better time possibilities also one or two more positions in the back would be established. The distance between the main position and first position in the back would be of that size so that attacker’s artillery could not fire on both. The main defence combat was to be performed in the main position while the positions in the back where to be used as reserve for defence if the main position was needed to be abandoned. Also between the main position and the back position the so-called fixed points as bunkers and machine-gun nests were to be established in order to slow down or stop the advancement of the attacking troops.[9]

The main poison was supposed to consist of three parallel defence lines that were connected with communication trenches. The first line was the main defence line while the other two were reserve lines. Also according to the proposal, the defence was to be performed in combination with the attack. If the first defence line was overrun the reserves from the other two were supposed to perform a counterattack and if that was not enough then the reserves from the back positions would also perform the counterattack.[10] Proposal maintained the values of cooperation between artillery, infantry and engineer troops.[11]

During the attacker’s artillery preparations the defenders' artillery was in cooperation with aeroplanes supposed to engage the attacker’s artillery. During the attack, the defence artillery was supposed to fire frontal fire or flanking fire called spare fire (spärreld on Swedish from the German term speerfeur) which was planned in beforehand.[12]

During the attack, the assignments of artillery were to initially engage enemy’s artillery and in later stage to support the attacking infantry by engaging barbed wire, machine guns nests, observations posts etc. During the final attack, the fire would be directed behind the defenders' main defence line in order to prevent reserves from reinforcing or performing a counterattack. Also, a part of artillery would still engage the enemy’s artillery.[13]

On the infantry side, the attacking force would be divided into storming columns where the first troops would advance in several dense formatted firing lines.[14] Also among the first advancing troops' engineers would participate in order to counter different types of obstacles. Proposal also put importance on the initiative among squad leaders and others commanders on the place who were supposed to lead their units on their own if a greater result during the attack could be achieved.[15]During the defence the infantry was supposed to take cover in the shelters during the attacker’s artillery fire and to leave the shelters in order to defend the position only after the attacker’s fire had been ceased.

References

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[1] KrA, generalstaben, chefsexpeditionen, serie B I. Angående anordnandet af öfningar i ställ­nings­krig, daterad 22 sep 1916. Just to mention for curiosity that Knut Gillis Bildt was the grand grandfather of Carl Bildt, Swedish politician and current Minister of Foreign Affairs.

[2] KrA, generalstaben, chefsexpeditionen, serie B I, Skrivelse till Konungen ang. utarbetande av förslag till instruktion för striden om befästa ställningar, 17 nov 1916.

[3] KrA, Infanteriinspektionen, serie B. Underdånigt utlåtande, daterat 25 nov 1916. Gunnar Kaijser was a teacher in military architecture at the War School in Karlberg and had during the war been studying fortifications in Switzerland.

[4] Lantförsvarets kommandoexpedition, serie B I, vol. 77, generalorder 29 december 1916 nr 1737.

[5] Lars Tingsten, Hågkomster (Stockholm: Bonniers, 1938), s. 337.

[6] Gustaf Bouveng ”Årsberättelse av föredraganden i krigskonst” i Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademiens hand­lingar 1917.

[7] Arvid Cronenberg, ”Säkerhetspolitik och krigsplanering; Huvudlinjer i arméns operativa planering 1906-1945”, i Bo Hugemark (red), Neutralitet och försvar; Perspektiv på svensk säkerhetspolitik 1809-1985 (Stock­holm: Militärhistoriska förlaget, 1986), s. 70-71.

[8] KrA, generalstaben, chefsexpeditionen, serie B I. Yttrande angående förslag till instruktion om befästa ställningar, daterat 1 juni 1917. Förslag till instruktion för strid om befästa ställningar fastställdes 4 juni 1917.

[9] Ibid, s. 4-5 och 12-13.

[10] Ibid, s. 45–46.

[11] Ibid, s. 23,

[12] Ibid, s. 42.

[13] Ibid, s. 56 och 60.

[14] Ibid, s. 61 och 77.

[15] Ibid, s. 78-79.

Pictures from invasion of Poland

Since it is 75 years ago since Poland was invaded by Hitlers regime here is a very interesting link where colored pictures can bee seen from during the time of invasion. 

http://life.time.com/history/world-war-ii-invasion-of-poland-1939-color-photos/#1